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I. INTRODUCTION
In most infant adoption cases contested by an unwed biological father,
the child remains in the physical custody of the prospective adoptive
parents,' with no visitation with the birth mother or birth father,2 during legal
1. While awaiting termination of their biological parents' rights, prospective
adoptive children may be placed in foster care or in a prospective adoptive home. Placement
in a prospective adoptive home prior to termination of parental rights creates a "legal risk"
situation. Especially in the case of infant adoptions, however, an emphasis on "bonding"
drives legal risk placements. See generally DOROTHY W. SMITH & LAURIE NEHLS SHERWEN,
MOTHERS AND THEIR ADOPTED CHILDREN: THE BONDING PROCESS (2d ed. 1988). Adoption
practitioners are best advised to require prospective adoptive parents to sign a "legal risk
acknowledgement" at the time of placement. Such an acknowledgement is required by
administrative rule in agency adoptions. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 65C-15.002(5), (6). See form
infra Appendix A. (Unless otherwise indicated, the forms appearing as appendices to this
article are the original work of the author for use by Adoption Advisory Associates and Cheryl
R. Eisen, P.A., in agency adoptions. Readers are welcome to adapt and use these forms for
their own practices, but no express or implied warranty is made as to their sufficiency or
advisability, legal or otherwise.)
2. Technically speaking, one's "birth father," synonymous with the term "natural
father," is one's biological father, whether known or unknown, whether married to one's
2
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proceedings which typically last for years. 3 Thus, the child lives, during a
critical period of his or her life, in a home and in a family from which he or
she ultimately may be removed by court order. If removed, the child goes to
the custody of a parent or parents with whom the child has no relationship,
save a biological link that has become remote for the child by disconnection
and the passage of considerable time. The extent of psychological damage,
caused to the child by the emotional uprooting attendant upon such a change
in physical custody, can only be hypothesized by the experts.
5
biological mother or not, whether one is adopted or not. The terms "birth father, .... birth
mother," and "birth parents" are typically used, however, to distinguish an adoptee's
biological parents from his or her adoptive parents. See generally ARTHUR D. SOROSKY, ET
AL., THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE 49-50 (1978).
3. See In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992) [hereinafter "Baby Jessica"]. In
Iowa's Baby Jessica case, the child was born in February, 1991. Id. at 240. Rehearing on the
Iowa Supreme Court's decision, affirming an intermediate appellate court's decision to reverse
a juvenile court's termination of parental rights, was denied in November, 1992. Id. at 239.
The total time elapsed from birth to denial of rehearing (and remand) was twenty-two and one-
half months. Id. at 239-40.
See also In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. 1994) [hereinafter "Baby Richardf]. In
Illinois' Baby Richard case, the child was born in March, 1991, and placed with an adoptive
family shortly thereafter. In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648, 650 (111. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993). The
United States Supreme Court's order, denying certiorari to the Illinois Supreme Court on its
judgment reversing the trial court's ruling that the father's consent to the adoption was
unnecessary, was entered in November, 1994. Doe v. Kirchner, 513 U.S. 994, 994 (1994).
The total time that elapsed from birth to denial of certiorari was forty-four months. Id.
In Arkansas' "Baby Sam" case, a procedurally complicated matter involving five
separate trial court actions and three appeals in two states (one is still pending), the child, a
newborn when litigation began, is over two years old at the time of this writing. Telephone
conversation with Anthony R. Marchese, Florida attorney for Mark and Tracy Johnson,
petitioners for adoption in the Juvenile Court of Tuscaloosa County, Ala., case no. JU 97-
534.01 (July 24, 1998). The court granted custody of Baby Sam to the adoptive parents on
April 28, 1998. See also Vitry v. Goronski, no. 96-2908 FD-14 (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct., Apr. 10,
1996) (related paternity action).
See also G.W.B. v. J.S.W., 658 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1995) [hereinafter "Baby Emily"], and
infra note 9 and accompanying text. In Florida's Baby Emily case, the child was born in
August, 1992. G.W.B. v. J.S.W., 647 So. 2d 918, 943 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994). The
Supreme Court of Florida's decision, approving an intermediate appellate court's order
affirming the trial court's final judgment of adoption, was handed down in July, 1995. Id. at
961. Total time elapsed from birth to final decision: thirty-five months. Id.
4. Under current Florida law, the child may in fact be put in the custody of another
relative or in foster care if the contesting parent or parents cannot or should not have custody
of the child. See FLA. STAT. § 39.811(1) (Supp. 1998).
5. Professor Suellyn Scarnecchia, of the Child Advocacy Law Clinic at the
University of Michigan Law School, refers to this as "transfer trauma," borrowing the term
from O'Bannon v. Town Ct. Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 802-03 (1980), where it "was used to
Eisen
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A. "Victimization" of the Child
In Florida's 1995 Baby Emily case,6 Supreme Court of Florida Justice
Gerald Kogan, writing a separate opinion,7 characterized the child, whose
unwed birth father contested her adoption, as "the most victimized party" in
8the case. Baby Emily was not removed from her adoptive home, and thus
was not subjected to the psychological trauma referred to above.9 Rather,
describe the harm a patient was likely to suffer if moved from one nursing home to another."
Suellyn Scarnecchia, A Child's Right to Protection from Transfer Trauma in a Contested
Adoption Case, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 41, 47 n.22 (1995). See also Madelyn Simring
Milchman, Ph.D., Bonding Trauma in Termination of Parental Rights Cases, 175 N.J. LAW.
29 (1996). Non-adoptive foster care during the pendency of a protracted adoption contest
compounds the risk to the child, assuring that he or she will suffer at least one psychologically
wrenching resettlement no matter who "wins" the lawsuit.
6. G.W.B. v. J.S.W., 658 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1995). See supra note 3 and
accompanying text.
7. Id. at 971-79 (Kogan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
8. Id. at 979.
9. G.W.B. v. J.S.W., 647 So. 2d 918, 944 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (Appendix:
original panel majority opinion). In Baby Emily, the child was placed for adoption by her
birth mother at birth through a Florida attorney/intermediary. Id. at 943. The trial court
initally found that there was insufficient evidence that the birth father had abandoned the birth
mother during her pregnancy, and thus the child was not free for adoption. Id. at 944. Upon
rehearing, however, the trial judge found that there was clear and convincing evidence that the
birth father had financially and/or emotionally abandoned the birth mother during her
pregnancy. Id. at 945. The court found that the birth mother was "on her own emotionally
during the pregnancy" and that the birth father had resumed a sexual relationship with a
former girlfriend while the birth mother was pregnant. Id. at 922. A three-judge panel of the
Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's finding of abandonment. G.W.B.,
647 So. 2d at 920. Upon rehearing en banc, the district court reversed the panel decision and
found that "for the final three months of her pregnancy, there was no financial support, no
physical assistance in obtaining medical care, including pre-natal care, or for any of her other
daily living requirements (and thus, as well, those of the unborn infant) and any emotional
factor contributed by the father was a negative influence ... the totality of the circumstances
here are... in support of a finding of abandonment." Id. at 924 (emphasis the court's).
The Supreme Court of Florida held that "[t]he determination of abandonment is fact
specific and, absent direction from the Legislature," it could not "dictate to trial courts
precisely how to evaluate the factors that go into making this decision." G.W.B., 658 So. 2d at
966. The supreme court ruled that section 63.032(14) of the Florida Statutes allowed a trial
court to consider emotional support in making its determination of abandonment and that the
record revealed that once the birth mother had moved out of the home, the birth father
provided no financial or emotional support. Id. at 966 (citing FLA. STAT. § 63.032(14) (Supp.
1992)). The supreme court noted the trial court's observation that the evidence suggested that
the birth father might have continued his passive stance toward the birth mother and the child
had the attorney/intermediary not contacted him regarding the adoption. Id. at 965. Even
[Vol. 23:339
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the impossibility of returning the three-year-old, a newborn when the
litigation began, to her status quo ante, to allow a dignified, timely, and
uncompromised resolution of her future, whatever the outcome, appears to
be what the Justice saw as insult to the child. Justice Kogan asked, "Where
does the fault lie?"' for the victimization of Baby Emily, and answered:
It rests on inadequate laws, procedural rules incapable of
recognizing the needs of a small growing child, state agencies too
unmindful of the biological father's rights, parties too eager to
litigate, judges and lawyers who let the child's fate bog down in a
quagmire of legal technicality. We all have failed Baby Emily.
B. Kinship Rights and the Best Interests of the Child
Proceeding from a discussion of the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Lehr v. Robertson,12 Justice Kogan suggested that the "two
competing standards" of one, birth parents' biological kinship rights to the
child and two, the best interests of the child, "both may actually have some
then, the record showed that the birth father still did not make any move to provide financial
or emotional support to the birth mother or the unborn child. Id. The Supreme Court of
Florida approved the district court's decision affirming the trial court's finding of
abandonment. Id. at 967.
In her specially concurring opinion, then district court judge, now Supreme Court of
Florida Justice Pariente, commented that a majority of the members of the Fourth District
Court of Appeal were concerned about the conduct of attorney/intermediary Charlotte H.
Danciu during the adoption proceedings. G.W.B., 647 So. 2d at 930-31 (Pariente, J.,
concurring specially). However, upon a complaint to the Florida Bar by the birth father,
Danciu was exonerated of any unethical conduct. Letter from David M. Bamovitz, Branch
Staff Counsel, The Florida Bar, to Steven M. Pesso, Esq. (May 3, 1995) (on file with Nova
Law Review). See infra Appendix B for the text of the letter.
10. G.W.B., 658 So. 2d at 979 (Kogan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
11. Id.
12. 463 U.S. 248 (1983). In Lehr, the United States Supreme Court decided the
question of whether a New York putative father's due process and equal protection rights
under the Constitution gave him an absolute right to notice and an opportunity to be heard
before his child could be adopted. Id. at 249-50. Answering in the affirmative, the Court
nevertheless held that the putative father's due process rights were not violated because the
New York statutory scheme adequately protected his inchoate interest in assuming a
responsible role in the future of his child in that the right to receive notice was completely
within the putative father's control (by filing in a putative father registry). Id. at 256-65. Nor
was the putative father's right to equal protection violated by the law, though it accorded
different rights to the custodial parent and one who had either abandoned or never established
a parental relationship with the child. Id. at 265-68.
1998]
5
Eisen: Using a "Brief Case Plan" Method To Reconcile Kinship Rights and
Published by NSUWorks, 1998
Nova Law Review
relevance" to the resolution of unwed father cases. 13 He referred to the Lehr
Court as finding that unwed putative fathers possess only what may be called
an "opportunity interest" in establishing legal fatherhood, which "matures
into a due process right if '[they accept] some measure of responsibility for
the child's future.' ,14 Justice Kogan then observed that "[t]he Lehr Court
regrettably was silent as to how we should balance 'best interests' against
,,15kinship rights when the two are in irreconcilable conflict ....
C. Callfor Reform
Seeking to solve this "legal conundrum," and seeing "no solution that is
free of tragedy,"' 6 Justice Kogan entreated the Family Law Rules
Committee of The Florida Bar, and the Florida Legislature, to study methods
of expediting contested adoption cases, 17 and noted that "[1]awsuits of this
type cry out for at least four broad reforms: (1) expedited review in the trial
court; (2) expedited appeal; (3) swift and certain finality of court decisions;
13. G.W.B., 658 So. 2d at 973 (Kogan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
14. Id. at 974 (emphasis added). See also, Roe v. Doe, 524 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1988), wherein a Florida District Court certified the following question to the
Supreme Court of Florida:
CAN THE FAILURE OF A PUTATIVE UNMARRIED FATHER TO
ASSUME SUPPORT RESPONSIBILITIES AND MEDICAL EXPENSES
FOR THE NATURAL MOTHER WHEN SHE REQUIRES SUCH
ASSISTANCE AND HE IS AWARE OF HER NEEDS, BE A BASIS FOR A
TRIAL COURT TO EXCUSE HIS CONSENT TO THE ADOPTION OF
THE CHILD, ON THE GROUNDS OF ABANDONMENT OR ESTOPPEL,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 63.072(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985).
Id. at 1044. In answering the certified question, the Supreme Court of Florida held that "an
unwed father's prebirth conduct in providing or failing to provide support ... and medical
expenses for the natural mother [was] relevant to the issue of abandonment under section
63.072(1) [of the Florida Statutes]." In the Matter of the Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741,
746 (Fla. 1989). The court went on to say:
[T]he failure of [a putative] father to provide prebirth assistance to [a]
pregnant mother, when he was able and assistance was needed, vested [the]
natural mother with the sole parental authority to consent to the adoption of
the child and removed from the natural father the privilege of vetoing the
adoption by refusing to give [his] consent.
Id. at 749. The holding was subsequently codified within the chapter 63 definition of
"abandonment." See FLA. STAT. § 63.032(14) (1997).
15. G.W.B., 658 So. 2d at 974 (Kogan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
16. Id. at 979.
17. Id.
[Vol. 23:339
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and (4) reasonable mechanisms to minimize psychological harm to the child
during the legal process." 18
The first three of Justice Kogan's requested reforms are well within the
legislative and judicial branches' ability to provide. However, what Justice
Kogan observed as the silence of the Lehr Court as to how to balance "best
interests" against kinship rights, resounds in the law's failure, to date, to
meet Justice Kogan's fourth request, for mechanisms to minimize
psychological harm to the child.
D. Evaluation of Performance
To protect the interests of both birth parents and children, Justice
Kogan suggested a fixed period during which a contesting unwed putative
father's "performance" vis-d-vis his newborn (up to six months old) child
could be evaluated by the state. 19 Most birth fathers likely would dispute
whether the state has the power to so impose upon their parental rights.
However, as Justice Kogan reminded: "It deserves emphasis here that the
unwed biological father's constitutional interest over the child is not fully
formed at this stage and therefore can be subjected to ... reasonable
restrictions or limitations." 20
The performance approach to unwed father cases proposed by Justice
Kogan is of the nature of what is known in child welfare and juvenile law
circles as a "case plan" method. 21 The case plan, a social service model for
working through issues of social welfare, is already recognized in chapter 39
of the Florida Statutes as a hallmark of child dependency cases.22 As will be
seen, this method is particularly well-suited to assist courts in balancing the
bests interests of children and the kinship rights of their birth parents in
contested adoption cases.23
18. Id. at 979 n.21.
19. Id. at 976.
20. G.W.B., 658 So. 2d at 976.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 23-28. "Case plan" is defined in the Florida
Administrative Code as "the goal-oriented, time limited individualized program of action for a
child." FLA. ADMIN. CODE 65C-15.001(13).
22. See generally FLA. STAT. § 39.601 (Supp. 1998).
23. See infra text accompanying notes 97-138.
1998]
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II. CHAPTERS 39 AND 63: AN ABBREVIATED OVERVIEW OF CURRENT
FLORIDA STATUTES RELATING TO ADOPTION
For the reader unfamiliar with the nature and scope of chapters 39 and
63 of the Florida Statutes, a brief summary will be helpful in understanding
the issues addressed in this article.
A. Florida Statutes Chapter 39 ("Proceedings Relating to Children")
Chapter 39 embraces "status" issues of child welfare. It provides the
framework for disposition of cases involving allegations of child dependency
due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment. In any dependency case, the parent
or parents of the child are entitled to a case plan which includes goals for
remediation, means to effectuate those goals, and methods to assess
outcomes. The purpose of the case plan is to assist the family to remain
intact or, where the child has been removed from the home, to reunify if and
when the plan's goals are met.24 A dependency not otherwise resolved ends
in an involuntary termination of parental rights25 and commitment of the
child to the Florida Department of Children & Family Services ("the
Department"), or to a Florida licensed child-placing agency ("licensed
,,26agency"). A chapter 39 proceeding for termination of parental rights is
also initiated when a child is voluntarily "surrendered" for adoption to the
Department or a licensed agency.27 In the case of a voluntary surrender, the
case plan goal is termination of parental rights rather than reunification of
the family.
28
The procedures established in chapter 39 for termination of parental
rights assure parents of constitutional protection against unreasonable
government interference with their liberty interest in rearing their
children.29 For example, parents must be afforded the right to counsel,
including court-appointed counsel if indigent, at every stage of the
termination proceedings. 30  Both the Department and otherwise "private"
24. See generally FLA. STAT. § 39.601(6) (Supp. 1998).
25. Id.
26. The Department is authorized to license agencies and promulgate rules for their
operation. FLA. STAT. § 409.175(3)(a), (4)(a) (1997).
27. See FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(a) (Supp. 1998).
28. Id. § 39.806(3).
29. "[A child's] natural parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care,
custody, and management of their children." G.W.B., 658 So. 2d at 966 (citing Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,753 (1982)).
30. FLA. STAT. § 39.807(1)(a) (Supp. 1998).
346 [Vol. 23:339
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licensed agencies are subject to chapter 39 due process requirements. 31
Presumably, licensed agencies are included in chapter 39 because they are
licensed by the state for the purpose of providing services generally
performed by the state itself, i.e., foster care and placement of children for
adoption, thus functioning quasi-publicly as state "actors" for due process
purposes.
32
31. See generally FLA. STAT. ch. 39.
32. SeeIn re R. J. C., 300 So. 2d 54,58 (Fla. lst Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
The [Children's] Home Society [a licensed agency] contends that... [it] is
not a 'foster home or agency of the state' and that the Order of Permanent
Commitment [of the child to Children's Home Society] was not based on the
inability or unfitness of the parents, but, rather, on the voluntary surrender of
the child for subsequent adoption. We find these distinctions to be without
merit.... [I]t is our interpretation... that the Home Society should be
considered a temporary foster home or, at the very least, an 'agency of the
state.'
Id. at 58. See also Swayne v. L.D.S. Soc. Servs., 795 P.2d 637, 640 (Utah 1990) (holding
private adoption agency was a "state actor" for due process purposes where termination of
parental rights statute provided for automatic termination of unwed father's rights unless he
had previously filed an acknowledgment of paternity). In Swayne, one member of the court
did not agree that the self-executing statute rendered the private agency a state actor merely by
its participation in the chain of events that rendered the father's rights terminated by operation
of law. Swayne, 795 P.2d at 645 (Howe, Assoc. C.J., concurring and dissenting).
Simply because the legislature has provided ... that the placement of an
illegitimate child by his mother with an adoption agency terminates the
opportunity for the father to register his claim of paternity does not, without
more, turn every adoption agency into a "state actor."... It is undisputed that
[the agency] receives no state funding and the state has no control over the
agency's internal affairs. The cases simply do not support the theory that
when a private person exercises a right or privilege granted by state law (such
as to receive children for adoption), that person becomes a state actor. If that
were so, every person licensed by the state in the various trades, occupations,
and professions would become state actors.
Id. at 645 (emphasis added). In Florida, however, private agencies are not only licensed by
the state, but their programs are closely regulated in many details. See generally
FLA. STAT. § 409.175 (1997) (licensure of child-placing agencies); FLA. ADMiN. CODE, ch.
65C-15 (child-placing agencies); and FLA. ADMIN. CODE, Ch. 10M-6 (foster home licensing by
child-placing agencies).
Florida's Second District Court of Appeal, in determining that due process
considerations required court-appointed counsel for an indigent father in a stepparent
adoption, recently stated that "[u]ndoubtedly, state action is ... an essential aspect of a
contested adoption proceeding under chapter 63.... Although such litigation is between
private parties, the power to terminate the rights of the nonconsenting parent is vested solely
in the judicial branch of the state government." O.A.H. v. R.L.A., 712 So. 2d 4, 6
(1998). Accord In re K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276 (Alaska 1991); In re Jay [R.], 150 Cal. App. 3d
Eisen
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Though a child whose parents' rights have been terminated in a chapter
39 proceeding is committed to the custody of the Department or a licensed
agency for subsequent adoption,33 chapter 39 does not address the initiation,
processing, and finalization of an adoption of the child. These matters are
addressed in chapter 63. 4
B. Florida Statutes Chapter 63 ("Adoption")
Chapter 63 performs two functions in regulating adoption that are
relevant to matters addressed in this article.35 First, it establishes the basic
requirements for adoption in Florida, including, inter alia, who may be
adopted, 36 who may adopt, 37 who must consent, 38 jurisdiction,39 and
venue.40 Second, chapter 63 limits, and imposes limitations upon, the
entities, other than the Department and Florida licensed agencies, permitted
to perform adoption placement4' activities in Florida.42
251, 197 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1983); D.S. v. T.D.K., 499 N.W.2d 558 (N.D. 1993). The second
district's opinion thus emphasized the nature of the right at issue, and the element of judicial
participation in the process to extinguish that right, rather than the nature of the facilitator of
the adoption (state agency, private agency, or private attorney) as determinative of the
question of whether due process protections apply in proceedings wherein parental rights will
be terminated. O.A.H., 712 So. 2d at 6-7. Query: Even where the termination of a parent's
rights is consensual, is the right to counsel at least a waiveable right of the consenting parent,
the absence of such waiver requiring court appointed-counsel if the parent is indigent?
33. FLA. STAT. § 39.811(2), (4) (Supp. 1998). After termination of parental rights
under chapter 39, the Department or licensed agency having custody of the child is the only
party who must consent to the child's subsequent adoption. Id. § 39.812(1).
34. See FLA. STAT. ch. 63 (1997).
35. Chapter 63 also regulates surrogate parent contracts. See FLA. STAT. §§
63.212(1)(i)(1-6) (1997).
36. Id. § 63.042(1).
37. Id. § 63.042(2), (3), (4).
38. Id. §§ 63.062, .072.
39. Id. §§ 63.102(2), .207(1).
40. FLA. STAT. §§ 63.102(2), (4).
41. Florida Statutes section 63.032(9) defines "to place" or "placement" as "the
process of a person giving a child up for adoption and the prospective parents receiving and
adopting the child, and includes all actions by any person or agency participating in the
process."
42. Limitations imposed on other entities making adoptive placements include the
regulation of fees and expenses under section 63.097, and of out-of-state placements under
section 63.207. FLA. STAT. §§ 63.097, .207 (1997).
[Vol. 23:339
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Chapter 63 permits adoptive placements not only by the Department
and Florida licensed agencies, but also by "intermediaries. 43  An
intermediary is a Florida licensed attorney or physician, or an out-of-state
agency that has been qualified by the Department to place in Florida.44 As
explained above,45 the Department and Florida licensed agencies may make
adoptive placements upon either an involuntary or voluntary chapter 39
termination of parental rights. Intermediaries facilitate voluntary placements
only, though such adoptions are occasionally contested,46 thus causing the
proceedings to take on an involuntary aspect. Placements by intermediaries
are not subject to chapter 39 termination proceedings, but are governed
exclusively by the provisions of chapter 63.
In intermediary adoptions, a birth parent "consents" to the adoption of
his or her child by either a specific named person or persons, or by a person
or persons whose identity is known only to an intermediary.47 The form for
consent to adoption, created by the Department for use by intermediaries as
48directed by statute, was last updated in 1986, and is inadequate in several
respects.49 Nevertheless, comparison of the consent form with a "surrender"
form of the type used by the Department and Florida licensed agencies
reflects the organic differences between intermediary and Department/
licensed agency adoptions.50
Unless a parent's rights have been previously terminated within a
chapter 39 proceeding or otherwise (including by the death of a parent),
43. Id. § 63.212(l)(c).
44. Id. § 63.032(8).
45. See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
46. When adoptions are contested by birth parents, they are usually seeking to revoke
a surrender or consent for adoption, or otherwise allege denial of due process. Fraud and
duress are presently the only statutory grounds upon which a birth parent may revoke a
surrender or consent for adoption. See infra note 66. Due process issues typically center on a
birth father's failure to receive notice, or denial of a right to withhold consent. See supra
notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
47. FLA. STAT. § 63.082(2).
48. Id. § 63.082(3)(a).
49. The form is defective in that: 1) it recites that the birth parent "agreets] to
relinquish" the child for adoption, thus giving rise to an argument that execution of the
document does not necessarily show a present intention to place the child for adoption; 2) the
statutorily required printed names, addresses and social security numbers of witnesses are not
called for as required by statute, § 63.082(4) of the Florida Statutes; and 3) the jurat does not
conform to current law requiring the notary to certify the type of identification upon which the
notary relied in verifying the identity of the individual executing the instrument. See FLA.
STAT. § 117.05(5) (1997). See form infra Appendix C.
50. See form infra Appendix D.
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parental rights are not terminated in a chapter 63 adoption proceeding until
the final judgment of adoption is entered.5' Thus, in intermediary adoptions,
termination of parental rights to the child to be adopted occurs later and
under different rules than in Department and Florida licensed agency
adoptions.
C. A Need for Change
Dichotomies of law and procedure between chapter 39 and chapter 63
have caused confusion and irrational results in contested Florida adoption
cases.52 This article suggests that Florida adoptions be processed exclusively
as a function of chapter 39 termination of parental rights proceedings, within
a unified statutory scheme embracing Department, agency, and intermediary
placements.53 Such a revision of the law would promote greater uniformity
in adoption actions, while affording optimal safeguards to protect not only
the best interests of children, but also those of birth parents and prospective
adoptive parents. This is because the law and procedures, as well as the
judicial and administrative expertise, already in place for chapter 39
proceedings, form the most appropriate paradigm within which to address
the legal issues presented in adoptions generally, and in contested adoptions,
specifically.
The Florida Senate's Committee on the Judiciary54 ("Judiciary
Committee") proposed Senate Bill 550 on adoption for consideration in the
51. See generally FLA. STAT. § 63.085(I)(d) (1997).
52. An example is Jones v. Children's Home Soc'y., 497 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1986), wherein the court held that the chapter 63 provisions that a birth parent's
consent to adoption of a child is irrevocable upon signing, Florida Statutes section 63.082(5),
did not apply to a surrender to the Department or a licensed agency under chapter 39. Id. at
1267. (Chapter 39 was amended to preclude this result by chapter 90-309 of the Laws of
Florida (amending FLA. STAT. 39.464(l)(a)(2)), after the Supreme Court of Florida
disapproved Jones on this point in Doe v. Roe, 543 So. 2d 741, 747-48 (Fla. 1989)). Only
recently has a Florida court determined that indigent birth fathers are entitled to court-
appointed counsel in chapter 63 proceedings wherein their parental ights are in jeopardy of
termination, though right to counsel in such situations is not mandated by statute as in chapter
39 proceedings. See supra note 32.
53. See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
54. The most active members of the Senate Judiciary Committee on Senate Bill 550
were Senators Dudley (R., S-25, Cape Coral) (chair); Campbell (D., S-33, Tamarac);
Ostalkiewicz (R., S-12, Orlando); Rossin (D., S-35, West Palm Beach); and Silver (D., S-38,
Aventura). The other members of the Committee were Senators Burt (R., S-16, Ormond
Beach); Crist (R., S-20, St. Petersburg); Grant (R., S-13, Tampa); Home (R., S-6, Orange
Park); Jones (D., S-40, Miami)(vice-chair); and Williams (D., S-4, Tallahassee). Of these, all
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1998 legislative session.5 The bill would have moved agency adoptions out
of chapter 39 and into chapter 63. Senate Bill 550 purported to establish
"parity" in private adoptions between Florida licensed agencies and
intermediaries, and would have otherwise significantly altered Florida
adoption law and practice.57 Though it won approval in the Senate, Senate
Bill 550 did not garner support in the House of Representatives, and thus
failed to pass into law. The bill's Senate supporters have prefiled the same
measure for consideration in the 1999 Legislature.
58
mn. UNWED FATHERS' RIGHTS AS ADDRESSED BY SENATE BILL 550
Before drafting Senate Bill 550, the Senate Judiciary Committee
identified eight "areas of concern" for adoption legislation.5 9 Birth parents'
but Home and Williams are attorneys, though none is a family law or adoption specialist.
Campbell is an adoptive parent and Jones has an adopted sister. It is unclear why the
Judiciary Committee's bill was not referred to the Senate's Children, Families, & Seniors
Committee for review and input.
55. S.B. 550, 15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998).
56. See infra Appendix E for an analysis of the most significant aspects of the bill,
prepared by the law firm of Hausmann & Hickman, P. A., Boynton Beach, Florida.
57. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMM. SUBsTrTurE FOR S.B. 550, § 16, 15th
Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998).
58. The bill has been filed as Sentate Bill 0002 for 1999.
59. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC
IMPACT STATEMENT, at 2-5 (Jan. 5, 1998). The eight concerns identified by the Senate
Judiciary Committee centered on:
1. bifurcation of adoption proceedings, first determining termination of
parental rights issues, then, if the child was determined in the first phase of
the proceeding to be available for adoption, finalizing the adoption;
2. banning of"prebirth termination" of birth fathers' parental rights;
3. improvement of safeguards to assure voluntariness of birth mothers'
consents;
4. assurance that birth parents are aware from their first contact with an
intermediary arranging an adoptive placement that the attorney represents the
adoptive parents' interests, not the birth parents';
5. creation of a centralized state repository for all adoption case records;
codification of the present case law rule that "best interests of the child"
6. evidence is not relevant in any adoption proceeding until the birth
parents' rights have been terminated, and the child is thus available for
adoption;
7. banning out-of-state placement for adoption of any child not falling
within the Florida Statutes section 409.166 definition of a "special needs
child" unless with a relative or stepparent; and
1998]
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rights issues are embraced by at least four of the Judiciary Committee's eight
concerns. 60 These concerns are collectively driven by just one immutable
underlying principle: that birth parents, including unwed fathers, are entitled
to a measure of due process protection in adoption proceedings. 61 However,
Senate Bill 550 moved perilously beyond the requirements of due process of
law, into the realm of child endangerment, by allowing an unwed father the
absolute right to veto a mother's decision to place a child for adoption and,
at the father's option, to take custody of the child, regardless of his fitness to
parent.62
8. extension of the fee and expense reporting requirements imposed on
adoption intermediaries to licensed adoption agencies.
Id.
60. See supra note 59, "concerns" listed 1, 2, 4, and 6.
61. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly identified parental rights as
liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747 (1982). In Santosky, the
Court stated:
The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody and
management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not
been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.
Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in
preventing irretrievable destruction of their family life.
Id. at 753. This principle applies to cases where the parental rights of unwed fathers are being
terminated. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), supra note 12, as well as Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
62. One provision of the bill severely limited a biological father's rights where the
mother is a married woman and the birth father is not her husband, the bill expressly provides
that no notice to the birth father of the proceeding to terminate parental rights is required,
whether or not the mother was cohabiting with her husband at the time of conception or birth.
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMM. SUBSTITUTE FOR S.B. 550, § 11, 15th Leg. Sess.,
Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998) (proposing to amend FLA. STAT. § 63.062(l)(b), (c), and (d)(3) (Fla.
Leg. 1997)). This concept follows Florida's current paternity law. See G.F.C. v. S.G., 686
So. 2d 1382 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997). "[T]he trial court properly dismissed G.F.C.'s
petition because [the paternity statute] does not afford G.F.C. the statutory right to sue for
paternity since the child in question.. .was not born 'out of wedlock' and the paternity of the
child had been 'otherwise' established." Id. at 1385. "Paternity would 'otherwise' be
established when a child is born to an intact marriage and recognized by the husband and the
mother as being their child." Id.
The second district recently extended the holding of G.F.C. to deny an alleged
biological father's cause of action to establish paternity where the mother of a child born out
of wedlock subsequently married the child's "reputed" father, a man who supported the
mother emotionally and financially throughout her pregnancy, and executed the documents
necessary to have himself identified as the father of the child on the birth certificate when the
child was born, after which he "gave the child his love, attention, and financial support." I.A.
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In the typical contested case, an unwed birth mother surrenders her
child for adoption, but the child's father, who is alleged to have abandoned
the child, objects. Senate Bill 550 proposed to address these circumstances
by creating section 63.089 of the Florida Statutes, which concludes, in sub-
section (5), as follows: 63
If the court does not find by clear and convincing evidence that
parental rights of a birth parent should be terminated pending
adoption, the court must dismiss the case with prejudice and that
birth parent's parental rights remain in full force under the
law.... The court must enter an order based [on] written findings
providing for the placement of the minor.... Further proceedings,
if any, regarding the minor must be brought in a separate custody
action under chapter 61, a dependency action under chapter 39, or
a paternity action under chapter 742.
64
Thus, in the posited case, where the father has not consented to adoption of
the child, Senate Bill 550 would have required a court to dismiss with
prejudice a proceeding for termination of parental rights pending adoption
("TPRPA") unless the court were to find sufficient clear and convincing
evidence of the birth father's abandonment 6s of the child. As an incident to
dismissal of the case, the court would have been required to make "findings"
to support a "placement" for the child, with no statutory guidance as to what
subjects such findings were to address, that is, what the criteria for
placement would be.
v. H.H., 710 So. 2d 162, 162-63 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998). The court certified the issue to
the Supreme Court of Florida where the case remains pending. Id. at 166.
63. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMM. SUBSTITUTE FOR S.B. 550, § 16, 15th
Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998) (proposing to amend FLA. STAT. § 63.089(5) (1997)).
64. Id. (emphasis added).
65. "Abandoned" is defined as:
[A] situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child, while being
able, makes no provision for the child's support and makes no effort to
communicate with the child, which situation is sufficient to evince a willful
rejection of parental obligations. If, in the opinion of the court, the efforts of
such parent or legal custodian to support and communicate with the child are
only marginal efforts that do not evince a settled purpose to assume all
parental duties, the court may declare the child to be abandoned. In making
this decision, the court may consider the conduct of a father towards the
child's mother during her pregnancy.
FLA STAT. § 63.032(14) (1997).
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A. An Irrebuttable Presumption of Fitness to Parent
However, the question of the child's placement upon dismissal of a
Senate Bill 550 TPRPA proceeding may be a nonissue because, under the
circumstances, the unwed father arguably would be the only legally available
custodian for the child. The mother having signed an unrevoked consent for
adoption,66 the father would be legally justified in insisting that the mother's
rights to the child be terminated before dismissal of the TPRPA action.
There being no dependency action underlying the termination of parental
rights proceeding, there would be no basis for placing the child in protective
care pending an investigation of the father's fitness to assume custody of the
child. 7 Further, there being no termination of the unwed father's parental
rights, the prospective adoptive parents would not be parties and would have
no standing to request temporary legal custody of the child.68 Thus, under
66. Present law provides that a birth parent's surrender or consent to adoption is
irrevocable once executed, absent fraud or duress. See FLA. STAT. §§ 39.464(1)(a)(2),
63.082(5) (1997). Senate Bill 550 would have provided a three-day revocation period (or one
day after a birth mother's discharge from a hospital in the case of a newborn adoption,
whichever occurs later) during which a birth parent could revoke a consent for any reason;
thereafter, consent could be withdrawn only if it was obtained by fraud or duress. See SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMM. SUBsTrruTE FOR S.B. 550, § 12, 15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess.
(Fla. 1998) (proposing to amend FLA. STAT. § 63.082 (1997)).
67. In chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes, unless: a) both birth parents have
surrendered the child for adoption; b) the identity of location of a parent is unknown; c) a
parent has engaged in conduct toward the child which "threatens the life... [or] well-
being... of the child irrespective of the provision of services" through a case plan; d) a parent
is incarcerated under certain conditions; or e) a parent has engaged in "egregious conduct,"
the only way to proceed to a final judgment of termination of parental rights is by first
establishing that the child is "dependent" and then offering the parent(s) a case plan for
reunification which fails. See FLA. STAT. § 39.806 (Supp. 1998).
68. The issue of standing of the prospective adoptive parents in the TPRPA
proceeding under Senate Bill 550 is not entirely clear, however. One provision which might
elevate them to party status states:
The petition must contain all names by which the minor is or has been
known.... to allow interested parties to the action, including... persons
with custodial or visitation rights to the minor, and persons entitled to notice
pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act... to identify their
own interest in the action.
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMM. SUBnSTrrurE FOR S.B. 550, § 14, 15th Leg. Sess.,
Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998) (creating FLA. STAT. § 63.087(6)(f)(1) (1998) (emphasis added)).
Should the prospective adoptive parents somehow fit within one of these classifications,
perhaps party status would be theirs. Otherwise, though the prospective adoptive parents
would become parties once an adoption petition is filed, the bill specifically provides that "[a]
petition for adoption may not be filed until 30 days after the date the judge signed the
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the language of Senate Bill 550, a court may well have had no alternative but
to place the child with the unwed father, not only without regard to the
possibility that the mother may have wanted to reclaim her parental rights if
her adoption plan for the child was to be frustrated,69 but with no permissible
antecedent inquiry into the prospective safety and security of the child
clearly established by law.
Though it is fundamental that a biological parent enjoys the
presumption of fitness to raise his or her child, this is a rebuttable
70presumption. Yet, as just seen, implicit in Senate Bill 550 was an
irrebuttable presumption that an unwed father, by his mere refusal to agree
to adoption of a child7 2 is not only a fit parent, but is more fit than the
mother to have custody. 2
judgment terminating parental rights pending adoption." Id. (creating FLA. STAT. § 63.087(5)
(emphasis added)). See also SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMM. SUBSTITUTE FOR S.B.
550, § 19, 15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998) (proposing to amend FLA. STAT. § 63.102)
("[A iter a court order terminating parental rights has been issued, a proceeding for adoption
may be commenced.") (emphasis added)). By analogy to the Florida Rules of Juvenile
Procedure, applicable in chapter 39 termination proceedings, the prospective adoptive parents
likely would have no party standing. FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.210(a).
69. It would be easy, and wrong, to suggest that a birth mother who has voluntarily
surrendered her child for adoption should not be permitted to reclaim the child if the birth
father subsequently objects to the adoption plan. The fact that a mother has surrendered a
child does not per se render her an unfit parent. On the contrary, Florida adoption
professionals confirm that birth mothers-who surrender may well be fit to parent
notwithstanding their decision to place. See infra Appendix F for "Results of Polling Florida
Adoption Professionals Regarding Psycho/Social Backgrounds of Children Placed for
Adoption" [hereinafter "Florida Adoption Professionals Poll"]. According to this poll, all
responding adoption attorneys and social service professionals agreed that a mother who has
surrendered should at least be permitted to request custody in these circumstances; 60%
agreed with the following statement: "Matters should go back to the way they stood before
the mother surrendered; the mother should have custody unless and until the father proves
[she is] unfit." Id. This is because some mothers make surrender decisions based upon
assumptions or conclusions that have changed or may be subject to change. For example,
before placing the child for adoption, birth mothers oftentimes refuse to explore the possibility
of family support of parenting their children, often keeping their pregnancies secret for fear of
family recrimination or disapproval. If the fact of the birth becomes known to the family
during an adoption contest, the birth mother may find support she had not otherwise expected.
70. See, e.g., Calle v. Calle, 625 So. 2d 988, 990 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
71. S.B. 550, 15TH LEG. SESS., REG. SESS. (FLA. 1998). It is very significant that
Senate Bill 550 did not in fact require the objecting father to request custody of the child in
order to stop the mother's adoption plan. Id. Thus, he could veto the adoption without
offering the child an alternative plan to raise the child himself.
72. See discussion supra note 69. A bias against birth mothers who surrender their
children for adoption appears evident in the fact that, despite the issue of fathers' fitness being
17
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B. Children at Risk
The decisions or actions of adults which bring a child to a court's
attention tend to reflect the presence of insecurity, instability, and even the
danger of abuse or neglect in the life of the child. There is no reason to
expect that the circumstances which bring a child before a court when an
unwed father contests the mother's adoption plan for their child are any
more pristine or benign than in other cases where child custody is at issue.
On the contrary, a child in these circumstances is "at risk" by any criteria
used for such assessments in child welfare cases.
"The quality of the research on child abuse and neglect" is considered
by social scientists to have advanced "in the 1970s and 1980s," providing
improved information through the use of "statistical analyses based [upon]
official reports [and] social surveys." 73 Theories based on this improved
research developed the theme that "'anyone' could abuse [or neglect] his or
her child in certain circumstances: when the stresses on them outweigh[] the
supports they [have]." 74 If anyone can abuse or neglect, then it is logical that
any child may be abused or neglected if the circumstances are right.
To determine the risk of child abuse or neglect for a given child, various
risk assessment models have been developed by social science scholars and
social service professionals. 75  What these models have in common is
repeatedly raised before the Judiciary Committee by this author, the only attention given to
parental fitness was in an eleventh hour floor amendment ("FAV 704320") permitting an
adoption entity to move a court for emergency relief to at least temporarily deny custody of a
child to a parent revoking consent to adoption if it is alleged that such a placement would
endanger the child. See Memorandum from Maggie A. Moody on C.S./S.B. 550 on Adoption
to the Adoption Round Table Members and Interested Parties (Apr. 17, 1998) (on file with the
Nova Law Review) (citing FAV 704320, 4/15/98). See also SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, COMM. SUBSTITUTE FOR S.B. 550, § 12, 15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998)
(creating FLA. STAT. § 63.082 (7) (1998)). In the majority of cases, consents are executed by
mothers only. Thus, Senate Bill 550 would have created the unreasoned policy that a birth
mother's fitness may be called into question if she seeks to exercise her statutory right of
revocation of consent proposed in the bill, but a putative birth father may have custody
without regard to his fitness.
It should be noted that FAV 704320 did not address the issue of to whom an adoption
entity should give custody of a child when both birth parents revoke their respective consents
to adoption.
73. RICHARD J. GELLES, THE BOOK OF DAVID: How PRESERVING FAMILIES CAN COsT
CHILDREN'S LIVES 81-82 (1996).
74. Id. at 82.
75. Id. at 80-86 (offering a general discussion of risk assessment factors and models).
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recognition of the nature of the factors that put children at risk. Though
generalization may offend, experienced Florida adoption professionals
confirm that the sociological profiles of children placed for adoption often
include many of the commonly recognized risk factors for abuse and
neglect.77
Furthermore, a mother's surrender of her rights to a child rmay, in some
cases, demonstrate her recognition of the child being at risk in some way.
This recognition may arise not only from a mother's belief that she cannot
successfully parent the child,78 but also from her negative evaluation of the
76. Id.
77. See infra Appendix F for the Florida Adoption Professionals Poll results. Seventy
percent of Florida adoption attorneys and social service professionals responding to a recent
survey identified "decreased emotional/mental stability and control, including immaturity due
to young age" as a risk factor, one-third responding that this characteristic was "typical" of the
psycho-social backgrounds of children under the age of five in whose adoptions the
respondents had been professionally involved. Id. Eighty percent identified "parent engaging
in or having history of alcohol/substance abuse [or] gambling" and "parent having history of
perpetrating or being victim of abuse [or] neglect" as risk factors, approximately one in five
reporting that the cases with which they were familiar "typically" involved these factors, and
half or more seeing these factors present "occasionally." Id.
78. Situations with which the public is most familiar are from news stories reporting
cases representing the two extremes of birth mother conduct. These two extremes denote
scenarios in which the birth mother did not want to parent. They are: 1) where the mother
abandons the child at birth, sometimes apparently intending that the child should die; and 2)
where the mother asserts, after having surrendered her child for adoption, that she was forced,
duped, or otherwise taken advantage of, such that the child should be returned to her.
The vast majority of cases fall somewhere between these two scenarios. The middle
ground is populated by mothers generally ranging in age between 15 and 35, who may or may
not be married, who may or may not have other children, who may or may not be receiving
public assistance, who may or may not have informed their families of their adoption plans,
who may or may not have been abused by the birth father of the child, who may or may not be
school drop-outs or college educated, who may or may not have a history of incarceration or
psychiatric admission, and who may or may not have a history of substance abuse. The birth
mother's belief that she cannot successfully parent the child, and thus that an adoption plan is
best, is affected by all of these factors, and more, in varying degrees.
It is very important that a birth mother receive meaningful preplacement counseling to
enable her to clearly identify for herself her reasons for making an adoption plan for her child.
If a birth mother has not been given this opportunity, or has refused to process this question,
one of two results may occur: either 1) after committing herself to an adoption plan, the birth
mother may come to realize, typically shortly before or immediately after the birth, that she
cannot go through with the placement; or 2) the birth mother will place the child for adoption,
but will suffer sometimes interminable grief and remorse with no hope of closure.
Postplacement counseling to assist in a birth mother's continuing adjustment post-partum is as
important as preplacement counseling, to help the birth mother through the mourning period
associated with placing a child for adoption.
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birth father as a prospective parent7 9 This is not to say that a mother should
be permitted to veto a father's custody of a child. However, there is no good
reason for not investigating the grounds for a mother's warning that a child
80
may be at risk if placed with the unwed father.
C. When and Where to Protect the Child
It was contended by proponents of Senate Bill 550 that any question of
the child's security or safety, if placed with a contesting birth father, could
be adequately addressed in a dependency action under chapter 39 of the
Florida Statutes.8l However, that contention does not recognize that, under
the bill, a dependency action could not be filed under conditions most likely
to protect the child. First, because such an action was characterized in the
82bill as a "further" proceeding, it appears that the statutory scheme would
have required any dependency action to be brought subsequent to dismissal
of the TPRPA proceeding. Second, the dependency action would have been
a "separate" proceeding in a different court.8 4 Given these requirements,
79. A birth mother's negative opinion of a birth father, as a prospective parent, may
be grounded in any number of observations about the father, including matters ranging from
his personal family background, to his present lifestyle (including relationships with and
support of his other children, if any), to his stated feelings about parenthood. To be sure, just
as in the case of divorce, acrimony between the parents of a child cannot per se divest one or
the other of their parental rights. Nevertheless, information provided by the parents is
generally a useful starting point for custody evaluation.
80. In fact, Florida law would hold a parent criminally responsible for abuse or
neglect perpetrated by the other parent which could have been prevented or stopped by the
actions of the "innocent" parent. See FLA. STAT. § 827.03(3)(a)(2), (3)(b) (1997); see also In
re B.S., 697 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the termination of mother's
parental rights was warranted by her knowing failure, despite having the opportunity and
capability, to prevent egregious abuse of child perpetrated by father, when mother acquiesced
in father's supervision of the child in her absence, notwithstanding father's history of pleading
guilty in manslaughter of another child, his four week old son, and repeated suspicious grave
injuries previously sustained by the child).
The "at risk" analysis in the text is also applicable, and a case plan method, like the one
described and set forth in the text accompanying notes 97-138, infra, could be used, where a
parent who has surrendered a child for adoption seeks to revoke the surrender under the
revocation provisions of the bill. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMM. SUBSTTUTE
FOR S.B. 550, § 12, 15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998) (creating FLA. STAT. § 63.082(7)
(Supp. 1998)).
81. FLA. STAT. § 39 (1997 & Supp. 1998).
82. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMM. SUBSTITUTE FOR S.B. 550, § 16, 15th
Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998) (proposing to create FLA. STAT. § 63.089 (Supp. 1998)).
83. Id.
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the opportunity to provide preemptive social services 5 before dismissing the
termination proceeding would be lost in favor of requiring a report of
suspected abuse, neglect, or abandonment 86 before intervention. Thus,
notwithstanding both what is known of the underpinnings of abuse and
neglect and, in given cases, a mother's concerns about a father's fitness too
parent, Senate Bill 550 would have permitted unnecessary risk to the
children by requiring courts to "look the other way" when dismissing
TPRPA proceedings.
D. Equal Protection of the Laws
Proponents of Senate Bill 550 also suggested that imposing a "fitness
test" upon an unwed father before allowing him custody of a child is
irrational and a violation of the constitutional right of equal protection of the
laws, because a married father is not subject to the same test on his way out
of the hospital with his wife and newborn baby. 87
Seductively simple, this argument is nevertheless inapt. It completely
disregards marriage as a legally significant social contract between society
and the participants in the marriage. 8  One important covenant of that
84. Senate Bill 550 would have established the TPRPA proceeding within chapter 63
of the Florida Statutes. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMM. SUBSTrruTE FOR S.B. 550,
§ 16, 15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998). Though the bill does not assign chapter 63
matters to the family division of the circuit court, that is where chapter 63 cases have been
assigned throughout the state for some time. Id. Chapter 39 dependency proceedings, on the
other hand, are within the purview of the juvenile division. Id. The procedural requirements
involved in keeping one judge "on the case," obtaining a consolidation order, waste precious
time and effort when a child's welfare is at stake. Id.
85. Primary among the social services that should be made available to a parent
contesting an adoption should be parenting education such as set forth in the "Outline for
Proposed Legislation" beginning infra at the accompanying note 112.
86. These are the grounds for government intervention in the parent-child relationship
regarding a child not otherwise before a court. See supra text accompanying notes 23-3 1.
87. State statutes often distinguish between the parental rights of unwed mothers and
those of unwed fathers. Such statutes have been attacked as violative of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, though such challenges
are less successful than those brought under the Due Process Clause. See supra note 61 for
leading cases.
88. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
The consent of the parties is of course essential to its existence, but when the
contract to marry is executed by the marriage, a relation between the parties is
created which they cannot change. Other contracts may be modified,
restricted, or enlarged, or entirely released upon the consent of the parties.
Not so with marriage. The relation once formed, the law steps in and holds
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contract is that the married couple will be co-responsible for the welfare of
children born to the wife or adopted during the marriage.89 This being so, it
can be said that the parenting of children is seen by society as a cooperative
venture between a mother and a father where each vouches for the
continuing fitness of the other to parent. At any time, one or the other
parent, or a government agency, may bring to the attention of society, in a
civil or criminal proceeding, that the security and/or safety of the child can
no longer be assumed. In such event, a court must ultimately decide what
custody disposition will be in the child's "best interests."
90
the parties to various obligations and liabilities. It is an institution .... the
foundation of the family and of society.
Id. at 211.
89. Indeed, the fact that a married man suspects he is not the father of a child born to
his wife does not automatically entitle him to require paternity testing in support of a
challenge of his obligation of support to the child. Such testing must be court ordered, and
will not be ordered if not determined by the court to be in the best interests of the child. See
FLA. STAT. § 742.12(2) (1997) ("the court may... require the child, mother, and alleged
fathers to submit to scientific tests.., to show a probability of paternity") (emphasis added).
Compare Department of Health & Rehabilitative Serv. v. Privette, 617 So. 2d 305, 308 (Fla.
1993) (holding that a trial court hearing a petition for paternity must determine "that the
child's best interests will be better served [by ordering a blood test] even if the blood test later
proves the child's factual illegitimacy"), with In re Paternity of Baby Doe, 558 N.W.2d 897
(Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that the putative father of a child born out-of-wedlock has a
statutory right to a determination of paternity and the court may not conduct a best interests
hearing as a prerequisite for ordering blood tests).
90. For an interesting summary of the history of adopin in America, including the
evolution of the concept of "best intest of the child" in the adopion context, see 1 JOAN
HEIFETZ HOLLINGER, ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, §§ 1.01-1.04 (1998). Hollinger
explains:
[A] distinctive feature of America's first adoption statutes was the
requirement of a judicial finding that the adopters were 'suitable' and that the
'moral and temporal' or best interests of the child would be served. Until
well into the 20th century, however, little was done to breathe life into this
requirement.... 'Suitability,' if scrutinized at all, was defined primarily in
terms of the financial solvency of the adoptive parents. The child's 'moral
and temporal' interests, or what would now be called the child's 'best
interests,' were similarly defined more in economic than in psychological
terms.
Id. § 1.03[2]. "Even as late as 1930 .... the best interest standard was confined to the
economic interest of the child." Id. § 1.03[7]. Today, "psychological and social conceptions
of children's well-being have displaced the earlier economic and moralistic ones. With this
has come a new understanding of why adoption is 'good' for children, adoptive parents and
birth parents." Id. § 1.04.
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Equal protection of the laws would certainly demand that an unwed
father not enjoy a greater presumption of fitness to parent than a married
father. Nevertheless, this would be the result if, as Senate Bill 550 appears
to have required, a child must be placed with an unwed father, regardless of
the fact that the child's unwed mother does not vouch for the father's fitness
to parent. On the contrary, where the mother has demonstrated her belief
that the child should be placed for adoption rather than be in the unwed
father's care,9' society has no alternative but to take seriously the mother's
concern and investigate the fitness of the father to parent before giving him
custody of the child.92
It might also be argued that a "test" for unwed fathers contesting
adoption of a child is irrational in light of the fact that an unwed mother who
chooses from the outset to parent, rather than place a child for adoption, is
not similarly scrutinized. Such an argument would miss the point that it is
not a parent's "unwed" status per se which calls his or her fitness into
question. Indeed, two unwed parents who agree extrajudicially on custody
and other matters regarding their child may never see the inside of a
courtroom. Rather, in a contested adoption, it is precisely because the
unwed parents have not agreed on a plan for their child, for whatever
reason, 93 that the child has come to public attention. In contrast, society's
91. The fact that the mother could have spared herself of the entire adoption process
by giving the child to the father to raise, if she perceived that as a feasible and desirable
alternative, should not be discounted in determining whether to heed her negative assessment
of the father's fitness to parent.
92. It bears mentioning here that there appears to have been disturbing implicit
assumptions about the motivations of birth parents in Senate Bill 550: a) the unsupported
negative assumption that a birth mother does not usually have valid, compelling reasons for
believing that the birth father of her child is or may be unfit to raise the child, or has no real
interest in raising the child; and b) the unsupported positive assumption that birth fathers who
make objections to adoptive placements do so only for the reason that they wish to create
homes for their children and raise them themselves. S.B. 550, 15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess.
(Fla. 1998). Though the occasional birth parent fits one or the other of these stereotypes, these
are hardly typical profiles. Id. As in so many other matters of human concern, there are very
few, if any, hard and fast rules in the sociolegal context of adoption. Id.
93. The parents may have reached no agreement regarding the child for any number of
reasons, including: 1) that the mother does not know the identity and/or location of the father;
2) that the father informs the mother that he has no interest in the child or denies paternity; 3)
that though the father is aware of the pregnancy, the mother informs him of her intention to
have an abortion and then relocates such that the father has no means of following up to
determine whether the pregnancy was terminated; 4) that there is generalized antipathy
between the parents, resulting in their inability to interact for the purpose of making crucial
parenting decisions; 5) the parents disagree on fundamental issues regarding custody, support,
education, visitation, etc.. or 6) the pregnancy was the result of sexual assault.
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social contract with married couples presumes that husbands and wives share
jointly the rights and responsibilities of the care, custody, and control of
their children.
It should be noted that the imperative to fully protect a child brought
within a court's jurisdiction is the reason the law dictates that prospective
adoptive parents participate in a "home study" before they can be eligible to
adopt.94 Further, a court must find a proposed adoption to be in the child's
best interests at the time of finalization.95 Absent the duty to protect children
placed for adoption, there could be no justification for such interference with
an infertile couple's plans for building a family. Instead, analogizing to
Senate Bill 550's illogic in setting the scene for automatic placement of
children surrendered for adoption with contesting unwed fathers, the law
would permit just anyone to adopt, and hope for the best.96
94. FLA. STAT. § 63.092 (Supp. 1998).
95. Section 63.092 of the Florida Statutes provides:
(2) PRELIMINARY HOME STUDY. - Before placing the minor in the
intended adoptive home, a preliminary home study must be performed by a
licensed child-placing agency, a licensed professional, or agency described in
[section] 61.20(2) .... The preliminary home study must include, at a
minimum:
(a) An interview with the intended adoptive parents;
(b) Records checks of the department's central abuse registry and criminal
records correspondence checks pursuant to [section] 435.045 through the
Department of Law Enforcement on the intended adoptive parents;
(c) An assessment of the physical environment of the home;
(d) A determination of the financial security of the intended adoptive
parents;
(e) Documentation of counseling and education of the intended adoptive
parents on adoptive parenting;
(f) Documentation that information on adoption and the adoption process
has been provided to the intended adoptive parents;
(g) Documentation that information on support services available in the
community has been provided to the intended adoptive parents;
(h) A copy of the signed statement required by [section] 63.085(1).
(i) A copy of the written acknowledgment required by [section] 63.085(1).
FLA. STAT. § 63.092 (Supp. 1998).
96. S.B. 550, 15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998).
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IV. A "BRIEF CASE PLAN" APPROACH TO ADOPTION CONTESTS
BY UNWED FATHERS97
As previously explained, the United States Supreme Court recognizes a
state's right to impose limitations relating to the welfare of children upon
unwed fathers' parental rights.98  However, because the dynamics of
individual cases cannot be assessed in advance, limitations which will
safeguard a particular child cannot be adequately legislated. Instead, what is
reasonable is to establish legislative parameters within which appropriately
licensed professionals 99  may assess specific cases and make
recommendations to courts regarding child custody in contested adoptions,
while providing concurrent judicial processes to move cases to expeditious
conclusion. Building upon Justice Kogan's previously discussed
"performance" concept, 1°t Senate Bill 550 should be rethought with regard
to birth fathers' rights. The "brief case plan" approach outlined at the end of
97. The term "brief case plan" is used to describe the method proposed in this article
for resolving contested adoptions by unwed fathers. The move toward alternative dispute
resolution based on "brief" models is already recognized among child welfare professionals as
demonstrated by the currency of the use of "brief therapy" and "brief evaluation" as case
management tools in dependency cases. Though it is anticipated that the situations in which a
brief case plan proposal would be brought into operation would be where a birth mother has
executed an irrevocable surrender of the child for adoption, such that only birth father issues
remain to be resolved, this proposal anticipates: 1) instances where the birth mother seeks
to revoke her surrender, either alleging fraud or duress, or revocation pursuant to a statutory
revocation provision such as that proposed in Senate Bill 550 (See SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, COMM. SUBSTrUTE FOR S.B. 550, § 12, 15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998)
(proposing to amend FLA. STAT. § 63.082(4)(c) (1997)); and 2) those instances where the
court determines that the birth father's rights cannot be terminated and thus the custody of the
child is subject to contest between the biological parents.
98. See supra notes 12-23 and accompanying text
99. Chapter 63 of the Florida Statutes incorporates by reference a listing of mental
health professionals approved for conducting home study evaluations of prospective adoptive
parents in intermediary adoptions. See FLA. STAT. § 63.092(2) (Supp. 1998). The listing is
contained in section 61.20(2) of the Florida Statutes as follows:
A social investigation and study, when ordered by the court, shall be
conducted by qualified staff of the court; a child-placing agency licensed
pursuant to [section] 409.175; a psychologist licensed pursuant to chapter
490; or a clinical social worker, marriage and family therapist, or mental
health counselor licensed pursuant to chapter 491.
FLA. STAT. § 61.20(2) (1997). These professionals, depending upon their experience, may be
appropriate for this purpose.
100. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
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the next section ("the Outline") is suggested as a framework for appropriate
legislation.'
0
'
Parts I through H1102 of the Outline address the basic issues of "who,
what, when, where, and how" as to the initial court procedures required to
process a birth parent's surrender of a child for adoption, regardless of the
child's age. Important features of these initial procedures include: 1)
adoption proceedings beginning and ending in juvenile courts, where the
most judicial experience in balancing child protection issues with the
preservation of parents' rights is concentrated, and where court rules which
facilitate such proceedings are already in place; 0 3 2) the possibility of filing
prebirth a petition to terminate parental rights to facilitate early identification
of interested parties (though termination would occur, if at all, only after
birth of the child);1°4 and 3) including in all surrenders an agreement to
submit to DNA testing, with or without a court order.
101. A detailed outline of suggested legislation is provided rather than a proposal cast
in bill form. This is because the proposal is made for revision of chapter 39 (Juvenile
Proceedings) to move all adoption matters into Juvenile Court, rather than for amendment of
chapter 63 (Adoption), even though the present legislative will appears to be in favor of
proposing to amend chapter 63. If the proposed policy were to be amended into chapter 63, it
is suggested that it be inserted immediately following section 63.032 (Definitions), and before
section 63.042 (Who may be adopted; who may adopt). If placed in chapter 39, it is suggested
that a new Part XII be created for adoption.
102. See infra notes 112-27 and accompanying text.
103. This proposal conflicts with Senate Bill 550 as to whether termination of parental
rights and adoption proceedings should come within the purview of juvenile courts under
chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes, as advocated here, or within the authority of the family
courts under chapter 63, as proposed in the bill.
There is presently only one provision in the family court rules, approved by the Supreme
Court of Florida in 1998, relating to adoption. See FLA. FAM. L. R. P. 12.200(a)(2) (requiring
the court to order a case management conference within sixty (60) days of the filing of an
adoption petition when: a) a waiver of consent is requested; b) "notice of the hearing on the
petition.., is not [to be] afforded a person whose consent is required but has not consented;"
c) "an intermediary, attorney, or agency is seeking fees or costs in excess of those provided
[by statute];" d) a party is to be served by constructive rather than personal service; or e) "the
court is otherwise aware that any person having standing objects to the adoption"). FLA. FAM.
L. R. P. 12.200(a)(2).
104. The filing of a prebirth petition for termination of parental rights would create a
more satisfactory basis for contacting a prospective father of a child to determine his
intentions toward the child once born. Service upon such individuals before birth would tend
to reduce the instance of ambiguity in the birth father's position regarding the child, It sets the
stage for a more expedient resolution of the child's status once born. If all prospective fathers
have been served by the time of birth, the case plan proposed can commence immediately,
thus reducing considerably the period of time after birth required to resolve the child's status.
See G.W.B. v. J.S.W., 647 So. 2d 918, 931 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994), rev'd, 652 So. 2d
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Part IV of the Outline ms establishes the beginning of "fast track" court
proceedings to resolve the child's future. Unless a court determines that
clear and convincing evidence of grounds for termination of the parental
rights of both parents already exist at the time of a preliminary hearing, this
procedure would provide the child with a brief case plan. The duration of
the case plan would be sixty days from the birth of the child, or the date of
the plan, whichever is later, or a lesser or greater period, if agreed upon by
the parties to the petition to terminate parental rights.
An evidentiary hearing is required to determine contested issues as to
termination of parental rights during the pendency of the case plan. Upon
expiration of the case plan, and depending upon whether the child was under
or over 180 days old, that is, an infant, at the time the petition for
termination of parental rights was filed, the proceedings would move in one
of several directions. Where an infant is involved, the case would go to a
disposition phase. In the case of non-infants, the court would permit, on
motion, the filing of a custody action under chapter 61 of the Florida
Statutes, a dependency action under chapter 39, or a paternity action under
chapter 742, within the same proceeding.
The requirements of the case plan, set forth in Part VI 6 of the Outline,
are intended to provide positive support to any party, as defined, seeking
custody of the child,1°7 while allowing an objective study of such person's
desire and ability to parent. The study requirements are comparable to those
imposed upon nonparty prospective adoptive parents under current law.
108
The concept of "constructive abandonment," a parent's demonstrated
unwillingness or gross inability to parent the child prospectively, is created
to address situations where the results of the case plan justify termination of
parental rights. The proposal also permits an unexpired case plan to be
curtailed if a court finds that the plan has become unnecessary due to a
change in circumstances.
The timetable established by the case plan proposal for contested cases
limits trial court proceedings for termination of parental rights to a maximum
816 (Fla. 1995), decision approved by 658 So. 2d 961 (1995) (Pariente, J., concurring)
(advocating this concept in theory).
105. See infra text accompanying note 128.
106. See infra text accompanying notes 133.
107. The "party seeking custody" may be either the mother or the father, or both. The
proposal provides that if parental rights are not terminated at an evidentiary hearing, such that
the case plan is extended for the purpose of determining a proper placement of the child, the
mother's surrender may be nullified by the court.
108. See FLA. STAT. §§ 63.092(2) (Supp. 1998), 63.125 (1997). See also FLA. ADMIN.
CODE R. 65C-15.028(3).
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of 147 days after service of process, with the case plan running concurrently.
Review in the district court, and certiorari and appeal to higher courts
remain available, though it is expected that good social work will minimize
the number of cases moving beyond the trial court level.
Finally, the provision for repose suggested in Part XI'0 9 of the Outline is
keyed to the date of final judgment of the adoption of a child, rather than to
the date of termination of parental rights as was proposed in Senate Bill
550.110 This is meant to discourage prospective adoptive parents from
waiting for repose before psychologically and legally finalizing the child's
adoption.'1 ' The suggested time for repose is 180 days.
V. OUTLINE FOR PROPOSED LEGISLATION
I. Initiation of a Proceeding for Termination of Parental Rights
upon Parent's Surrender. In all cases where a parent ("the
Parent") of a child ("the Child") surrenders the Child for adoption
to an adoption entity ("Adoption Entity")' 12 licensed or authorized
in this state, a petition ("Petition") for termination of parental
rights pending adoption ("TPRPA") shall be filed in the juvenile
division of the circuit court ("the Court") of this state, in the
county where the Adoption Entity is located,' no more than seven
(7) days' 14 after the Parent's surrender is executed. No fee for
filing the Petition shall be charged by the Clerk of Court ("the
109. See infra text following note 138.
110. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMM. SUBSTITUTE FOR S.B. 550, § 27,
15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998) (proposing to amend FLA. STAT. § 63.182) (1997)).
111. Id.
112. Senate Bill 550 coined the term "adoption entity" as an umbrella designation for
all persons and organizations permitted to place children for adoption in Florida. S.B. 550,
15TH LEG. SESS., REG. SESS. (FLA. 1998). See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMM.
SUBSTITUTE FOR S.B. 550, § 6, 15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998) (proposing to amend
FLA. STAT. § 63.032 by adding sub-section (15) which reads as follows: "'Adoption Entity'
means the department under chapter 39; an agency under chapter 63 or, at the request of the
department, under chapter 39; or an intermediary under chapter 63, placing a person for
adoption.").
113. This provision regarding venue adopts current law regarding venue for agency
adoptions. See FLA. STAT. § 63.102(2) (1997).
114. This time period accommodates the birth mother's statutory right of revocation of
her consent as proposed in SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMM. SUBSTITUTE FOR S.B.
550, § 12, 15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998) (proposing to amend FLA. STAT. §
63.082(4)(c) (1997)).
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Clerk")." '5  If any other proceeding regarding the Child was
initiated in the a division of the circuit court of this state prior to
the time of filing the TPRPA Petition, the TPRPA action shall be
filed in the existing case.' 16 Any action previously filed in any
court in this state other than a juvenile division of the circuit court
shall be, if necessary, consolidated into the TPRPA action.
Prebirth Petitions. A prebirth Petition may be filed to facilitate
the process of providing notice of the intention of the mother ("the
Mother") to surrender the Child for adoption at birth, to any man
who may be, or may claim to be, the legal and/or biological father
of the Child ("Prospective Father"). Nevertheless, no surrender of
a child shall be executed, and no order terminating the parental
rights of a child's parent(s) shall be entered, until after the birth of
a child."
17
Agreement to Provide Biologic Material for Paternity Testing. A
surrender of a child for adoption shall contain a provision that the
party signing the surrender agrees to provide biologic material
necessary for the purpose of establishing the identity of the
biological father of the Child, with or without a court order.
II. Advisory Hearing; Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem;
Temporary Custody. At the time of filing the Petition, Petitioner
115. No filing fee is presently charged for chapter 39 termination of parental rights
actions. FLA. STAT. ch. 39 (1997 & Supp. 1998). A filing fee may be charged, as is the
present case, if and when the adoption proceeding is filed. See generally FLA. STAT. § 39.472
(Supp. 1998).
116. Present statutory law provides that in intermediary adoptions, the intermediary
must report any intended placement of a minor for adoption before the child is placed in the
prospective adoptive home (unless it is a family or stepparent adoption). FLA. STAT. §
63.092(1) (Supp. 1998). Senate Bill 550 would have perpetuated this requirement, and
extended it to all "adoption entities." See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMM.
SUBSTrrUTE FOR S.B. 550, § 17, 15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998) (proposing to amend
FLA. STAT. § 63.092(1) (1998)). If this reporting requirement is to be retained, the report
should be filed in juvenile court, with the petition for TPRPA being filed in the same
proceeding. Section 63.102(5) of the Florida Statutes permits the filing of a "petition for
declaratory statement" for "prior approval of fees and costs" in connection with a proposed
placement. FLA. STAT. § 63.102(5) (1997). If such a petition is to be filed, it would likewise
be filed in the juvenile court wherein the notice of intent to place is filed.
117. The "no prebirth surrender" requirement is presently the law, as provided by
statute. FLA. STAT. § 63.082(4) (1997).
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shall assure that the Clerk will set an advisory hearing ("Advisory
Hearing"), to be held within seven (7) days, at which time the
Court shall: a) appoint a guardian ad litem ("the GAL") for the
Child;' 8 b) make a determination of temporary custody of the
Child, which may be with the Prospective Adoptive Parents or in
foster care, whichever appears to be in the best interests of the
Child considering the facts and circumstances of the case; and
c) determine who, if anyone, shall have temporary visitation with
the Child.
IE. Parties. The necessary parties to the TPRPA proceeding shall be:
a) the Adoption Entity to which a Parent has surrendered or
intends to surrender the Child for adoption, as petitioner ("the
Petitioner"); b) the Mother;" 9 c) any Prospective Father of the
Child, including those identifiable through the inquiry outlined in
section 39.803 of the Florida Statutes; d) any other person or
118. Section 39.807(2)(b) of the Florida Statutes provides:
The guardian ad litem has the following responsibilities:
To investigate the allegations of the petition and any subsequent matters
arising in the case and, unless excused by the court, to file a written report.
This report must include a statement of the wishes of the child and the
recommendations of the guardian ad litem and must be provided to all parties
and the court at least [forty-eight] hours before the disposition hearing.
To be present at all court hearings unless excused by the court.
To represent the interests of the child until the jurisdiction of the court over
the child terminates or until excused by the court.
To perform such other duties and undertake such other responsiblities as the
court may direct.
FLA. STAT. § 39.807(2)(b) (Supp. 1998).
119. Though the mother's surrender would be irrevocable except upon a showing of
fraud or duress (unless a revocation period for surrender, such as that proposed in Senate Bill
550, were available) the mother's rights are not terminated automatically, but require judicial
action. Where a mother who has surrendered decides to contest on the grounds of revocation,
fraud, or duress, her rights would be addressed within the proceeding proposed in the Outline.
120. Section 39.803 of the Florida Statutes provides:
(1) If the identity or location of a parent is unknown and a petition for
termination of parental rights is filed, the court shall conduct the following
inquiry of the parent who is available, or, if no parent is available, of any
relative, caregiver, or legal custodian of the child who is present at the
hearing and likely to have the information:
(a) Whether the mother of the child was married at the probable time
of conception of the child or at the time of birth of the child.
[Vol. 23:339
30
Nova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 7
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol23/iss1/7
1998]
entity having physical or legal custody of the Child; and e) the
GAL.
Prospective Adoptive Parents not Parties. The Prospective
Adoptive Parent(s) of the Child, notwithstanding that they may be
granted temporary physical custody of, or temporary visitation
with the Child, shall not be parties to the TPRPA proceeding until,
if at all, they are notified by the Court that parental rights have
been terminated, the Child is free for adoption, and an adoption
petition may be filed.121 Such notification shall not issue until the
(b) Whether the mother was cohabiting with a male at the probable
time of the conception of the child.
(c) Whether the mother has received payments or promises of support
with respect to the child or because of her pregnancy from a man who claims
to be the father.
(d) Whether the mother has named any man as the father on the birth
certificate of the child or in connection with applying for or receiving public
assistance.
(e) Whether any man has acknowledged or claimed paternity of the
child in a jurisdiction in which the mother resided at the time of or since
conception of the child, or in which the child has resided or resides.
(2) The information required in subsection (1) may be supplied to the court
or the department in the form of a sworn affidavit by a person having personal
knowledge of the facts.
FLA. STAT. § 39.803 (Supp. 1998).
The Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure provide a form which tracks the statute set
forth above. FLA. R. Juv. P. Form 8.969 ("Affidavit of Mother Regarding Unknown Father").
It should be modified for use in situations where the father is known, but the possibility of
other prospective fathers is to be negated. See Appendix G infra for a worksheet to assist the
practitioner in assuring the completeness of the birth mother's affidavit regarding the identity
of the father.
121. The Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure limits the parties to juvenile
proceedings, including proceedings to terminate parental rights, as follows: 'Definitions.
For the purpose of these rules the terms 'party' and 'parties' shall include the petitioner, the
child, the parents of the child, the department, and the guardian ad litem, when appointed."
Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.210(a). Though, under this definition, prospective adoptive parents are not
parties to termination proceedings under current law, they do enjoy at least "'participant"'
status: "Additional Participants. 'Participant' means any person who is not a party but who
should receive notice of hearings involving the child. Participants include ... identified
prospective parents .... Participants may be granted leave by the court to be heard without the
necessity of filing a motion to intervene." Id. at 8.210(b). However, it is arguable that rule
8.210(a), by its very terms, is definitional only, and does not circumscribe the entire class of
persons who might otherwise become parties, even rule 8.210(b) "participants" who, though
they may be granted leave to be heard without the "necessity" of intervenor, nevertheless may
choose to move to intervene if they might otherwise establish a legal basis for doing so. Id.
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time for filing motions for rehearing or clarification has expired or,
if filed, disposed of as set forth in Part X, below.
Notice of Action and Preliminary Hearing. All necessary parties
shall be served with a notice ("the Notice") of action and
preliminary hearing ("Preliminary Hearing") for TPRPA,122 issued
by the Clerk, with a copy of the Petition attached, at the earliest
possible moment following the filing of the Petition, except that if
service of process is waived in writing by any necessary party,
notice to that party shall be provided by the Petitioner by certified
mail/return receipt requested/restricted delivery,123 and by the
Clerk by regular mail, to the address provided by that party in said
waiver.124 Notice shall not be excused except by order of the
Court, for good cause shown, upon written waiver by the party for
whom excuse of notice is sought.
Service of Process. Service of the Notice shall be in accordance
with the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure except as otherwise
provided herein. Service shall be by personal service if a party is
known, located, and residing within this state. Service shall be by
constructive service, as provided in chapter 49 of the Florida
Statutes, if a party is unknown, not locateable, or located but
residing outside this state. The affidavit necessary to support
constructive service upon any party1 5 shall be in compliance with
122. See Appendix H infra for a form for Notice of Action and Hearing.
123. Using the United States Postal Service's "restricted delivery" certified mail
service is advisable for three reasons: 1) the privacy of the addressee is protected by requiring
the addressee's signature, not just a recipient's signature, for delivery of the mail; 2) the
sender has a written record of actual receipt by the addressee personally, the certified mail
receipt being returned to the sender after delivery; and 3) under Senate Bill 550, a court
making a determination of abandonment is required to take into consideration "[w]hether
other persons prevented the person alleged to have abandoned the child from making the
efforts referenced in this subsection [to participate supportively in the birth mother's prenatal
care]." See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMM. SUBSTITUTE FOR S.B. 550, § 16, 15th
Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998) (proposing to create FLA. STAT. § 63.089(4)). Were
someone to be found to have intercepted unrestricted certified mail to the father, the father
would have legitimate grounds on which to avoid a finding of abandonment under the bill.
124. To further assure that the birth parent signing the surrender is on notice of the
anticipated TPRPA action, the surrender, a copy of which should be given to the birth parent,
should recite the name, address, and phone number of the court where the TPRPA will be
filed.
125. See FLA. STAT. § 49.031 (1997).
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section 39.803(6) of the Florida Statutes.126 If residing outside
this state, a party shall be mailed a copy of the Notice, with a copy
of the Petition attached, by certified mail/return receipt
requested/restricted delivery by the Petitioner, and by regular mail
by the Clerk.
127
IV. Response to Notice of Action. The Mother and/or a Prospective
Father of the Child who has been served with or has otherwise
received the Notice, who wishes to assert parental rights to the
Child, must respond ("Response") to the Notice by the date of the
Preliminary Hearing indicated on its face, which date may not be
less than thirty days nor more than forty-five days after the last
date of personal service upon any necessary party, and/or
126. Florida Statutes section 39.803(6) (Supp. 1998) provides:
The diligent search required by [these rules] must include, at a minimum,
inquiries of all known relatives of the parent or prospective parent, inquiries
of all offices of program areas of the department likely to have information
about the parent or prospective parent, inquiries of other state and federal
agencies likely to have information about the parent or prospective parent,
inquiries of appropriate utility and postal providers, and inquiries of
appropriate law enforcement agencies.
FLA. STAT. § 39.803(6) (Supp. 1998).
These are minimum requirements. Indeed, a better guide to the parameters of an
acceptable diligent search are reflected in Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure Form 8.968
("Affidavit of Diligent Search"). FLA. R. Juv. P. Form 8.968.
127. Section 49.12 of the Florida Statutes provides:
If the residence of any party to be served by publication is stated in the sworn
statement with more particularity than the name of the state or country in
which the defendant resides, the clerk or the judge shall mall a copy of the
notice by United States mail, with postage prepaid, to each defendant within
10 days after making or posting the notice, the date of mailing to be noted on
the docket with a copy of the pleading for which the notice was issued.
FLA. STAT. § 49.12 (1997).
Service of process by constructive service is not effective where the pleading is not
mailed along with the notice. See Coin Copies, Inc. v. Financial Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 472
So. 2d 869 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Tompkins v. Barnett Bank, 478 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1985). If a notice mailed by the clerk is not returned, it is presumed that it was
delivered as addressed. See Lear v. Lear, 95 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 1957). Because the mailing
(and nonreturn) of the notice is jurisdictional, an affidavit by the clerk that the notice was
mailed and not returned should be considered an important element of proof of service along
with the publication affidavit. See Appendix I infra setting out a form for "Clerk's Affidavit
of Compliance with Mailing Requirements for Constructive Service of Process."
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commencement of publication for constructive service,128 and
notify the court clearly and unequivocally of her/his desire to seek
custody of the Child. To "respond" shall mean to communicate
with the Court in a writing filed in the court file before the time of
the Preliminary Hearing, or to attend the Preliminary Hearing.
Postponement and Re-Notice. If the date of the Preliminary
Hearing must be rescheduled due to failure to timely serve a
necessary party, notice of the new hearing date shall be served by
mail upon any party previously personally served, at the same
address where personal service occurred, or at any other address
subsequently provided to Petitioner in writing by that party,
without the necessity of further service of process. Any party who
waived service of process shall be notified of the new hearing date
at the same address to which notice was previously mailed, or at
any other address subsequently provided to Petitioner in writing by
that party.
V. Termination of Parental Rights at Preliminary Hearing; Actual
Abandonment. If at the Preliminary Hearing the Court: a) finds
that all necessary parties have been served with the Notice as set
forth in Part I or IV, above; and b) finds that the Court has
received no Response from the Mother or any Prospective Father
notifying the Court of her/his desire to seek custody of the Child;
and c) finds by clear and convincing evidence that: 1) the Mother
surrendered the Child for adoption freely and voluntarily by an
unrevoked 129 instrument duly executed for that purpose; 13 and 2)
any and all Prospective Fathers surrendered the Child for adoption
freely and voluntarily by an unrevoked instrument duly executed
128. This time frame is different than what chapter 49 provides for constructive
service, but is within its due process limitations, and thus a scheme not in conflict with chapter
49. See FLA. STAT. ch. 49 (1997 & Supp. 1998).
129. Senate Bill 550 permitted revocation of a consent to adoption within three days of
signing under certain circumstances. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMM.
SUBSTITUTE FOR S.B. 550, § 12, 15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998) (proposing
amendments to FLA. STAT. § 63.082 (1997)).
130. See Appendix J infra for a sort of self-proving "truth-in-adoption" document
developed by this writer to be used as evidence of the "free and voluntary" nature of a birth
parent's surrender.
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for that purpose, or executed a denial of paternity of the Child,131
or actually abandoned the Child, the Court shall enter a judgment
("Judgment") setting forth its specific findings of fact, terminating
the Mother's and any and all Prospective Fathers' parental rights
to the Child, and freeing the Child for adoption. To "actually
abandon" shall mean to abandon a child as defined in section
63.032(14) of the Florida Statutes. 132
VI. Case Plan; Appointment of Supervising Agency; Evidentiary
Hearing. If at the Preliminary Hearing the Court does not
terminate parental rights as provided in Part V, above, but finds
that the Mother and/or a Prospective Father by a Response has
clearly and unequivocally notified the Court at or before the
Preliminary Hearing that she/he wishes to seek custody of the
Child ("Party Seeking Custody"), the Court shall at the
Preliminary Hearing: a) inform any Party Seeking Custody, if
present, of her/his right to counsel;133 b) appoint counsel if any
Party Seeking Custody so requests and is indigent; c) direct the
Department of Children & Family Services ("the Department") or
a Florida licensed child-placing agency ("Licensed Agency"), as
supervising agency ("Supervising Agency"), to prepare and file a
proposed case plan ("Plan") for the Child within five (5) days of
the Preliminary Hearing, to be heard for Court approval within ten
131. Senate Bill 550 recognized an "affidavit of nonpaternity" as a substitute for
consent by a man identified by a birth mother as the father of her child. See SENATE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, COMM. SUBSTITUTE FOR S.B. 550, § 11, 15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla.
1998) (proposing to amend FLA. STAT. § 63.062 (1997)). The form contents required by this
section are inadequate to the form's purpose. First, though titled an "Affidavit of
Nonpatemity," the form never actually states that the affiant is not the father of the child.
Second, although proposed subsection (4)(a) of the same section requiring the affidavit states
that the affidavit "shall not be executed before birth of the minor," the form provides for
recitation, in paragraph 4, that affiant has "not supported the birth mother or her child or
unborn child with support of any kind." Most importantly, the form does not require
recitation of the child's birth date or gender, thus leaving open the potential for an attempted
withdrawal of the affidavit on the basis of mistake or fraud. A better method for allowing a
putative father to "sign off" his rights is by a "denial of paternity." Such an instrument is
identical to a surrender form, see Appendix D infra, except it states at the outset that 1) the
man executing the denial is not the child's father; but 2) even if he is the father, he surrenders
the child and waives all rights. See id.
132. FLA. STAT. § 63.032(14) (1997). See supra note 65 for text of definition.
133. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of the right to
counsel.
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(10) days of the Preliminary Hearing; and d) set an evidentiary
hearing ("the Evidentiary Hearing") on all then-contested issues,
which hearing must be held and completed no less than ten (10)
nor more than twenty (20) days from the date of the Preliminary
Hearing, unless good cause is shown to shorten or enlarge this
time. Neither the Department nor a Licensed Agency shall be
disqualified from serving as Supervising Agency for the Plan
because it is also the Petitioner.
Service of Plan; Objections to Plan. A copy of the proposed Plan
shall be served by mail by the Supervising Agency on all parties to
the proceeding. If any party objects to the Plan, the Court shall
determine at the Evidentiary Hearing whether and in what manner
the Plan should be modified.
Duration of Plan. The duration of the Plan shall be sixty days
from the birth of the Child, or the date of the filing of the Plan,
whichever is later, or a lesser or greater period if agreed to by the
parties and approved by the Court. The Plan shall be appropriate
to the needs of the Child, with the goal of assisting the Court in
determining what disposition to make of the Petition, among the
alternatives set forth in Part IX, below. Requirements for the Plan
are set forth in Part VII, below.
Termination of Parental Rights at Evidentiary Hearing. Should
the Court determine at the Evidentiary Hearing that the Mother and
any and all Prospective Fathers of the Child are estopped to assert
parental rights because they have executed surrenders of the Child
voluntarily, without fraud or duress, which surrenders have not
been revoked as may be provided by law, or that the Mother has
surrendered the Child as aforesaid or actually abandoned the
Child, and any and all Prospective Fathers have executed denials
of paternity, or actually abandoned the Child prior to filing a
Response to the Notice, the Court shall enter a judgment
("Judgment"): a) based upon written findings of clear and
convincing evidence, terminating all parental rights to the Child; b)
terminating the Plan; and c) freeing the Child for adoption.
Continuation of Plan When Rights Not Terminated at
Evidentiary Hearing - Child Under 180 Days of Age. If
parental rights are not terminated at the Evidentiary Hearing, the
Court shall enter its order a) setting forth all contested issues and
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the Court's findings of fact thereon and, if the Child was less than
180 days of age at the time of the filing of the Petition, b)
providing that the Plan shall remain in effect pending the
Disposition Hearing provided for in Part IX, below.
Child 180 Days Old or Older. If parental rights are not terminated
at the Evidentiary Hearing and the Child was 180 or more days of
age at the time of the filing of the Petition, the Court shall: a) on
proper motion and payment of any applicable filing fee, enter its
order allowing the filing of a custody action under chapter 61 of
the Florida Statutes, a dependency action under chapter 39 of the
Florida Statutes, or a paternity action under chapter 742 of the
Florida Statutes, within a time certain, not to exceed ten (10) days
from the date of the order, in the same proceeding, and b) enter its
order determining temporary custody of the child. If no such
action is filed within 10 days, the Court shall proceed as set forth
in the preceding paragraph without regard to the Child's age.
VII. Case Plan Requirements
A. Plan Contents. The Plan shall provide for:
1. The expiration date of the Plan;
2. Identification of Plan participants (i.e., the parties and
the Prospective Adoptive Parents), the Supervising Agency
and agency personnel responsible for the Plan, and outside
resources/personnel (including any out-of-state agencies) to
be utilized to promote the requirements of the Plan (including
names, addresses, telephone numbers, and other pertinent
data);
3. care and maintenance of the Child pending disposition of
the proceeding, including room and board, provision for the
medical, emotional, and social needs of the Child and, if
applicable, the educational, religious, and cultural needs of
the Child (physical custody of the Child to be with foster
parents, unless the GAL requests, the Supervising Agency
recommends in the Plan, and the Court orders, that physical
custody be with the Prospective Adoptive Parents, and they
are agreeable to the arrangement);
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4. supervised visitation by non-custodial Plan participants
(the Prospective Adoptive Parents, if not physical custodians
of the Child under the Plan, having no visitation with the
Child unless the GAL requests, the Supervising Agency
recommends in the Plan, and the Court orders, that they may
visit with the Child, and they are agreeable to the
arrangement);
5. modification of the Plan should the needs of the Child
change during the pendency of the Petition (including, but not
limited to, circumstances resulting in the need for a change of
physical custodian of the Child or a change in any visitation
schedule);
6. extension of the expiration date of the Plan if
necessitated by a motion for rehearing or clarification, or by
resort to a higher court;
1 34
7. paternity testing for any Party seeking custody who
claims to be the biological father ("the Father") of the Child;
8. counseling support for Plan participants pending final
disposition of the Petition;
9. a written psycho-social assessment of any Party seeking
custody of the Child including the Party's strengths,
resources, desire and readiness to parent; 35
10. parenting education for any Party seeking custody of the
Child; and
11. weekly assessment by the Supervising Agency as to the
Plan's progress and the Child's well-being, based on contact
with the Plan participants and review of any evaluations made
by third parties as required by the Plan;
B. Obligations of Parties Seeking Custody. Any Party seeking
custody of the Child shall submit to interviews and testing as
required by the Plan and shall provide upon the request of the
Supervising Agency:
134. See infra Parts X, XII.
135. See infra note 136.
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1. his or her full legal name, maiden name if applicable,
aliases if applicable, birth date, birth place, and social security
number, as well as the same information for all persons
residing in, or anticipated to reside in, the Party's household
should Custody of the Child be awarded to him or her;
2. information as to his or her employment history, places
and dates of residency, marital history, and familial
relationships;
3. a financial affidavit;
4. a blanket authorization for release of information by any
source having knowledge of the matters set forth in
subsection (c), below, and/or of matters arising from the
planning, testing, visitation, education, or any other service or
evaluation otherwise contemplated by the Plan; and
5. biologic material necessary for paternity testing at a time
and place, and in a manner, specified by the laboratory
conducting the testing.
Continuing Duties of Parties Seeking Custody. A Party seeking
custody of the Child shall have a continuing duty to keep the
Supervising Agency apprised of any changes in the information
required to be provided under this subsection (B), to cooperate
with the Supervising Agency and its agents, and to facilitate
implementation of the Plan.
C. Psycho-Social Assessment. The written psycho-social
assessment, referred to in subsection (A)(9), above, as to any Party
seeking custody of the Child, shall be prepared by a licensed
mental health professional trained and experienced in risk
assessment 136 and shall include data and impressions regarding:
1. the Party's social situation, medical health, mental
health, employment, and criminal history, including exposure
to or perpetration of child abuse, domestic violence, and/or
substance abuse;
2. the Party's current employment, income, other financial
resources, housing (a home visit is required), and plan for
136. See supra note 99.
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child care should Custody of the Child be awarded to him or
her;
3. the Party's potential for successful parenting as may be
determined by current psychological and/or psychiatric and/or
substance abuse and/or domestic violence evaluation(s),
parenting education outcomes, and performance as to other of
the Party's children, if any; and
4. state and local criminal background checks and child
abuse registry checks for the Party and all persons residing in,
or anticipated to reside in the Party's household, should
Custody of the Child be awarded to him or her.
D. Parenting Education. Parenting education shall be provided
to any Party seeking custody of the Child, including information to
allow the Party:
1. to identify various stages of child development;
2. to understand the emotional, nutritional, and intellectual
stimulation requirements of the Child;
3. to appreciate the principles of child safety;
4. to recognize alternatives to physical punishment to
accomplish child discipline;
5. to access medical and social services available to the
Child and the Parent; and
6. to understand and seek out resources for any existing
special medical and/or educational needs of the Child.
E. Copies of Plan to be Provided. A copy of the Plan shall be
provided to all Plan participants, except that information
identifying the Plan participants shall be redacted from the copies
to preserve the Plan participants' privacy.
VIII. Case Plan Status Report. Ten (10) days prior to expiration of the
Plan, the Supervising Agency shall file with the Court a status
report detailing the results of the Plan. A copy of the status report
shall be served by mail by the Supervising Agency upon all parties
to the termination proceeding.
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IX. Disposition Hearing. No later than the date of expiration of the
Plan, the Court shall hold a hearing ("Disposition Hearing") to
determine the final disposition of the Petition, and shall enter its
judgment ("Judgment") setting forth such disposition within five
days of the Disposition Hearing. The Court shall take into
consideration the report of the Supervising Agency, the
recommendation of the GAL, and the presentations and arguments
of any other party, and shall dispose of the Petition, based upon
written findings, in one of the following ways:
A. Termination of Parental Rights; "Constructive
Abandonment." If supported by clear and convincing evidence,
confirm the Mother's and/or the Father's surrender or denial of
paternity, or find the Mother and/or Father to have actually or
constructively abandoned the Child, and terminate the Mother's
and Father's parental rights, freeing the Child for adoption. 137 To
"constructively abandon" a child means to evince unwillingness
and/or gross inability, as demonstrated by the outcome of a child's
case plan, to assume care, custody, and control of a child for the
purpose of providing a child a safe and stable family life.
-OR -
B. No Termination of Parental Rights. If supported by clear
and convincing evidence of revocation, fraud, or duress as to the
surrender of either of them, void both the Mother's surrender and
the Father's surrender, if any, rendering the surrenders and the fact
of their execution nullities for all purposes, and, depending upon
the Court's findings as to the best interests of the Child:
1. Shared Parental Responsibility. The Court shall award
shared parental responsibility for the Child to the Mother and
the Father, determining primary residential custody of the
Child, awarding liberal visitation to the non-residential
Parent, and reserving jurisdiction to award child support upon
proper motion; or
2. Sole Custody to Mother. The Court shall award sole
Custody of the Child to the Mother, with or without visitation
137. Actual abandonment may be found at the Disposition Hearing notwithstanding a
previous finding of no actual abandonment if the court finds clear and convincing evidence of
actual abandonment at the time of the Disposition Hearing.
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by the Father, reserving jurisdiction to award child support
upon proper motion; or
3. Sole Custody to Father. The Court shall award sole
Custody of the Child to the Father, with or without visitation
by the Mother, reserving jurisdiction to award child support
upon proper motion.
Continuing Jurisdiction. Should the Court dispose of the Petition
pursuant to this subsection (B), the Court shall retain jurisdiction
over the Child as in a child custody proceeding under chapter 61 of
the Florida Statutes.
Change in Physical Custody Following Trial Court's Order. If
physical custody of the Child is to change as a result of the Court's
Judgment under this Part IX, the Judgment shall set forth with
specificity the time, manner, and conditions for transfer of
custody, which shall occur no less than five (5) calendar days from
the date the Court's order becomes final, as set forth in Part X,
below.
X. Judgment; Motions for Clarification and/or Rehearing; Finality
of Judgment. Any Party to the TPRPA proceeding may file a
motion for clarification or a motion for rehearing of the Judgment
disposing of the Petition under Part IX, above, within seven (7)
days of the date of the Judgment, with a courtesy copy of said
motion, to be delivered by the moving party on the day of filing, to
the judge who entered the Judgment or, in his or her absence, to
the chief judge of the Court. If no such motion is filed, the
Judgment shall be final.
Disposition of Motions. If a motion for clarification or a motion
for rehearing is filed, the judge who entered the Judgment or, in
his or her absence, a judge designated by the chief judge of the
Court, shall consider the motion and, within five (5) days of the
filing of the motion, enter an order either denying the motion or
requiring response to the motion by the non-moving party or
parties. If required, the response(s) shall be filed within five (5)
days of the date of the order, with a courtesy copy delivered as set
forth above. Any reply shall be filed within five (5) days of
service of the last response, also with a courtesy copy delivered as
above. An order disposing of all outstanding motions shall be
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entered no later than ten (10) days after the filing of the last
permissible reply or response, whereupon the Judgment shall be
final as modified, if at all, by the order.
XI. Filing Petition for Adoption. A petition for adoption of the Child
shall be filed, if at all, only after the entry of a Judgment that is
final as set forth in Part X, above. The adoption petition shall be
filed within the TPRPA proceeding, accompanied by payment of
the appropriate filing fee for adoption cases in that circuit.
XII. Appeal. Any party to the TPRPA proceeding may file an appeal
from the Judgment disposing of the Petition. Appeal shall be to
the district court of appeal and shall be expedited pursuant to the
rules of court relating to child welfare cases. Notice of appeal
shall be filed within five (5) days of the date of the Judgment of
the circuit court becomes final.
En Banc Review. The district court shall consider en banc
whether the trial court's disposition of the Petition was, a)
supported by clear and convincing evidence and b) in the Child's
best interests without regard to the Child's prospective adoption.
Motions for Rehearing Prohibited. No motion for rehearing of
the district court's decision shall be filed. Motions for
clarification are permitted, but may be stricken on the court's own
motion if found to be primarily in the nature of a motion for
rehearing.
Change in Physicial Custody following District Court Decision.
If the district court's decision requires a change in physical
custody of the Child, the court's order shall set forth with
specificity the time, manner, and conditions for transfer of
custody, which shall occur no less than five (5) calendar days from
the date the court's decision becomes final after disposition of
motions for clarification, if any.
XIII. Early Termination of Case Plan and Disposition. A court may at
any time, on motion of any party to the TPRPA proceeding or on
its own motion, terminate the Plan and make final disposition of
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the Petition as otherwise provided herein if such is found to be in
the best interests of the Child.
138
XIV. Repose. No action or proceeding of any kind, by any person, to
vacate, set aside, or otherwise nullify a final order of termination
of parental rights pending adoption on any grounds may be filed
after 180 days from entry of a final judgment of adoption of the
Child.
VI. CONCLUSION
Statutes and court cases notwithstanding, adoption is not primarily a
legal event. When legal mechanisms fail in contested adoption cases, it is
because they are not forged in patient understanding of the non-legal
circumstances, motivations, needs, and goals of everyone involved in a
prospective adoption. 39 Because the primary imperative of the law is to join
the issues and render a decision, and because emotionally-charged matters
are at stake, the early circumspection necessary in these cases, which can be
accomplished through experienced social work, is not always practiced.
Though "wait, watch, and listen" is not in the general legal lexicon, such an
approach, properly managed, is precisely what will protect children's best
interests, in both the short term and the long term. At the same time, this
approach will also protect the kinship rights of the children's biological
parents, as well as the rightful expectations of prospective adoptive parents.
The essential shortcoming of Senate Bill 550, as it relates to unwed
birth fathers' rights, was its naive refusal to distinguish between fathers who
138. Those circumstances might include, but would not be limited to, a settlement
among the plan participants, the development of evidence that the prospective father is not the
biological father of the child, or abandonment of the case plan by the birth parent(s).
139. In adoption circles, the primary parties to an adoption are referred to as "the
triad," meaning the birth parents, the adoptive parents and the adoptee. See generally ELINOR
B. ROSENBERG, THE ADOPTION LIE CYCLE (1992). However, it is important to recognize that
because adoption, like procreation itself, is an issue which touches the very core of our lives,
there are many other "participants" in an adoption whose thoughts and feelings about adoption
may have significant impact on the process. These may include triad members' friends,
family, physicians, religious advisors, and teachers, to name a few, and, indeed, adoption
social workers and lawyers. Perhaps in recognition of the expansive nature of the adoption
"interest group," the Evan B. Donaldson Institute uses the term "adoption constellation" to
refer collectively to "birth parents, adoptive parents, adopted children and adults, and the
professionals who serve them." EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INST., ANN. REP., AUG.
1996-JUNE 1997.
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wish merely to assert parental rights and those who demonstrate commitment
and ability to undertake responsibility for parenting their children. An
unwed father's bare objection to the adoption of a child, presented with no
substantial intention and fitness to raise the child himself, should not
determine the child's fate.
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APPENDIX A
FORM FOR PROSPECTIVE ADOPTIVE PARENTS' ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
OF LEGAL RISK PLACEMENT (AGENCY)
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND AGREEMENT RE: LEGAL RISK PLACEMENT
Prospective Adoptive Parent(s):
Child's Adoptive Name-
Date of Birth: Date of Placement:
THIS IS A "LEGAL RISK PLACEMENT." PARENTAL RIGHTS HAVE NOT YET BEEN TERMINATED.
The birth mother of the child being placed in your home for the purpose of adoption executed a written
surrender as provided by law/has stated she will execute a written surrender as provided by law on or
about . Under Florida law, such a surrender is irrevocable
absent a showing of fraud or duress in the surrender process. Nevertheless, the law requires that a
judicial termination of the parental rights of both the birth mother and the birth father occur. Papers
initiating this proceeding will be filed by the Agency's attorney. (Note: The termination proceeding is
separate and apart from, and precedes the filing of, an adoption proceeding on behalf of the prospective
adoptive parents.)
The birth father's parental rights are expected to be addressed within the termination proceeding as
follows:
Depending upon the complexity of matters relating to the birth father's rights as described above, the
termination of parental rights process may involve one (1) to six (6) months. You will be notified in writing
of the court's decision. In the event the Agency is unable to obtain judicial termination of parental rights,
the Agency may require return of the child to the Agency's physical custody with or without a court order.
By execution of this Acknowledgement and Agreement re: Legal Risk Placement, you agree to relinquish
physical custody of the child to the Agency if so required.
Prospective Adoptive Parent
Prospective Adoptive Parent
Agency Representative
Date
Date
Date
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APPENDIX B
FLORIDA BAR GRIEVANCE COMMITEE LETTER
EXONERATING INTERMEDIARY CHARLOITE DANCIU
OF PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT IN BABY EMILY
THE FLORIDA BAR
May 3, 1995
RE: Complaint of Gary Bjorkland against Charlotte Danciu, Esquire
Fifteenth Judicial Circuit Grievance Committee 'F" has devoted considerable time at several of its
meetings to an extensive consideration of the remarks of the Fourth District Court of Appeals [sic] in the
Baby Emily adoption case and Mr. Bjorkland's grievance. It has, by unanimous vote, made a
determination of no probable cause for findings of violation ....
In its review, the committee found that the portion of the court's decision entitled "Conduct of the
Attorney/Intermediary" appeared to contain many inaccuracies. As an example, the court makes reference
to an August 12, 1992, hearing on the adoptive parents' 'motion to waive the biological father's consent
toadoption*. In fact, the motion that was noticed for August 10, 1992, specifically states that the purpose
of the hearing was to hear objections. The court further observes:
There is no evidence in the record, nor have we been apprised of any evidence,
to indicate that the biological father deliberately avoided service of the notice of this
hearing by a duly appointed process server.
It was obvious to the committee that the court simply did not have, as part of the record before it, the
transcript of the August 10, 1992, hearing. In fact, the court notes that the adoptive parents brought to
its attention the notice of hearing which it observed was not part of the record.
Further, the court noted that Ms. Danciu did not inform the trial court of the July, 1992,
conversation with Mr. Bjorldand. That is not accurate. Ms. Danciu informed Judge Vonhof of her
telephone conversation with Mr. Bjorkland. It appeared very clear to the committee that it was as a result
of that conversation that Ms. Danciu determined to attempt to address Mr. Bjorldand's position as related
to her In that call, by scheduling a pre-birth hearing for the purpose of hearing 'your [Mr. Bjorkland's]
objections.
The committee examined the testimony of the proposed adoptive father regarding when he learned
of Mr. Bjorkdand's objections. It appeared very clear to the committee that the proposed adoptive father's
testimony related to Mr. Bjorkland's post birth actions and did not purport to address when the proposed
adoptive parents first learned that Mr. Bjorldand was objecting. The proposed adoptive parents have
confirmed that they were aware of Mr. Bjorkland's objections soon after Ms. Danciu's July, 1992,
conversation with Mr. Bjorkland.
While the court seemed to criticize the procedure employed by Ms. Danciu, viz., a pre-birth hearing
for the purposes of addressing a father's objections, the committee found no ethical impropriety in Ms.
Danciu's attempt to proceed in that fashion. In fact, there appeared to the committee a rather considerable
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appeal to the concept of addressing all potential impediments to an adoption, pre-birth.
The committee very carefully read and re-read the colloquy between Ms. Danciu and Judge Vonhof
at the August.10, 1992, hearing. While there is no question but that Ms. Danciu stated: "There is no
objection at all... ., the committee concluded that when read in context of the events that preceded the
hearing and occurred at the hearing, the referenced remark was made in the context of filed objections.
It appeared obvious to the committee that there was no purpose for the hearing other than to address the
natural father's objections. The notice of hearing specifically so stated. Most persuasive to the committee
however, were the remarks of Judge Vonhof, who... reviewed the transcript of the August 10, 1992,
hearing and advised that "I can only say, once again, that I do not feel that I was in any way lead astray
by any comments, or lack of same, by Ms. Danciu." His honor had previously, unsolicited, informed that
[sic] committee that " .. . I truly believe that the record that the Fourth District Court of Appeals [sic]
reviewed could not have been complete or they would not have made the remarks that they did as to Ms.
Danciu's conduct."
Very truly yours,
Isl
DAVID M. BARNOVITZ
Branch Staff Counsel
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APPENDIX C
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVICES' FORM
FOR CONSENT TO ADOPTION FOR USE BY ADOPTION INTERMEDIARIES
In The Circuit Court Of The
Judicial Circuit
Of Florida, By And For The
County Of
Case No.
In The Matter Of The Adoption of
CONSENT FOR ADOPTION
STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF
Before me this day personallyappeared ,who, being dulyswom,
deposes and says:
I,the undersigned ofa child known as
Mother/Father Sex First
bomthe dayof ,19.
Middle Last
at County,
do hereby agree to relinquish all rights to and custody of the child to a person or persons unknown to me and do further
consent to adoption by said person or persons if a Court of competent jurisdiction should approve. The names of the
person or persons to whom this Consent is given are known to
Intermediary. I hereby %vaive notice of any proceedings for this adoption.
That this Consent is executed voluntarily and is done so by the undersigned without requiring the identification
of the adopting parent or parents.
That the biological, sociological and medical history information regarding the above named child and the natural
parents, as required by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services pursuant to Section 63.082(3)(a), Florida
Statutes, is contained in HRS-CYF Form 5108, BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON PROSPECTIVE ADOPTIVE CHILD, and
HRS-CYF Form 5074, FAMILY, SOCIAL AND MEDICAL INFORMATION OF CHILD TO BE ADOPTED.
(SEAL)
Signed, sealed and delivered In the presence of.
STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day before me, an officer duly authorized in the state aforesaid and in the county
aforesaid to take acknowledgements, personally appeared
known to me to be the person described in and who executed the foregoing Consent for Adoption and acknowledged
before me that executed the same.
WITNESS my hand and official seal in the county and state last aforesaid this day of ,19
Notay Publc, State of Flodda at Large
(Notarial Seal) My Commission Expires:
HRSCfF Fer 5110. J7 n W- (ObS cle. 0 R-S) Fer 40 wi f na be noo)
POck N~eker 5749-0M11")
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APPENDIX D
FORM FOR SURRENDER OF CHILD FOR ADOPTION
TO A FLORIDA LICENSED CHILD-PLACING AGENCY
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR COUNTY, FLORIDA
In the Interest of:
JUVENILE DIVISION
CASE NO.:
a Child.
SURRENDER AND CONSENT FOR ADOPTION
WITH WAIVER OF NOTICE. SERVICE OF PROCESS. AND RIGHT TO COUNSEL
_ _,_ I of , telephone ,
age _, the Birth Parent of , a __ child, born to
on , at Hospital, County, Florida,
desiring to release my said child for the purpose of adoption as provided by law, hereby freely and
voluntarily:
1. SURRENDER my child to ('the Agency'), a Florida
licensed child-placing agency willing to receive my child for the purpose of placement for
adoption, or its designate.
2. WAIVE NOTICE, SERVICE OF PROCESS AND ANY RIGHTTO COUNSELas to any and
all hearings and p'oceedings legally necessary for the termination of my parental rights.
commitment of my child to the custody and guardianship of said Agency or any designate
of the Agency, and for subsequent adoption proceedings.
3. CONSENT IRREVOCABLY, UNCONDITIONALLY, AND FINALLY TO:
(a) the permanent loss, deprivation and forfeiture of my parental rights to my child
as now exist or heretofore existed;
(b) the entry of a court order terminating my parental rights, committing my child to
the custody and guardianship of the Agency or its designate for subsequent
adoption and/or any other court orders sought with the consent of the Agency,
believing such termination of my parental rights to be In the manifest best
interests of my Child;
(c) the placement of my child by the Agency or its designate in a family home,
which may or may not be known to me, for prospective subsequent adoption; and
Page I of 2 Initials
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SURRENDER AND CONSENT FOR ADOPTION WITH WAIVER OF NOTICE, SERVICE OF PROCESS
AND RIGHT TO COUNSEL
(d) the appearance by the Agency or its designate as a party in any court where the
legal adoption of my child is pending, to make all necessary consents to such
adoption.
4. WAIVE ALL RIGHT to knowledge at any time hereafter of the whereabouts of my child,
or the identity or location of any custodian or adoptive parent of my child, or to have any
court compel the Agency, or anyone in its stead, to divulge any such information.
5. ACKNOWLEDGE that I have been offered the opportunity of receiving independent legal
advice at no charge to me before signing this legal document and have either received
such advice or have declined it.
BIRTH PARENT'S SIGNATURE:
PRINT NAME:
DATE:
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:
X
as witness to the voluntary nature of the Birth Parent's acts and waivers herein
Print Name: SS#:
Home Add.:
Bus. Add.:
X
as witness to the voluntary nature of the Birth Parent's acts and waivers herein
SS#:_ _Print Name:
Home Add.:
Bus. Add.:
STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF
BEFORE ME, an offiber authorized to take acknowledgments, appeared
, who produced as identification
and acknowledged that s/he did execute the foregoing Surrender and Consent for Adoption, Waiver of
Notice, Service of Process and Right to Counsel, freely, voluntarily and for the purposes stated therein at
--._ AM. PM. on this day.
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL in the county and state last aforesaid this __ day of
,19__
NOTARIAL SEAL Notary Public
Page 2 of 2 Initials _
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APPENDIX E
ANALYSIS OF VARIOUS CHANGES TO FLORIDA'S ADOPTION STATUTE
AS PROPOSED IN THE FLORIDA SENATE JUDICIARY COMMIITEE'S
COMMITTEE SUBSTITUTE FOR SENATE BILL 550
(FLORIDA LEGISLATURE 1998)
Prepared by Hausmann & Hickman, P. A.
Attorneys at Law
Boynton Beach, Florida
1. Proposed Section 39.464: Child's Right to Petition for Termination of Parental Rights
The proposed bill's impact on Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes (Juvenile Court Statutes) has the apparent
intent of removing agency adoptions from Chapter 39 proceedings and placing agency adoptions within Chapter 63
proceedings. However the additional language proposed for section 39A64 limits the class of individuals who have
standing to file a Chapter 39 Termination of Parental Rights Petition from "any person" to the Department, the GAL
and "any person related to the child." In practice, this proposed language would limit the child's ability to obtain
independent counsel and petition for termination. In the landmark case, In the Interest of Gregory K the Florida
Supreme Court stated that a child could petition for termination of parental rights provided he petitions through a next
friend. Traditionally, children file such petitions through professional attorneys who appear in a case as their next
friend and attorney ad litem. Most often, such professionals are not related to the child.
2. Proposed Section 63.03: Birth Parent Fraud
Adds a provision within the Adoption Statute which states that any person who accepts benefits related to the
same pregnancy from more than one adoption entity commits a second degree misdemeanor, and that any person who
knowingly provides false information shall be subject to civil repayment penalties. This is an excellent provision
designed to protect adoptive parents from fraud and misrepresentation.
3. Proposed Section 63.039: Liability of Attorneys and Adoption Entities
This proposed section places upon an attorney duties and liabilities outside of the obligations currently
imposed by the Florida Bar and potentially holds attorneys liable for malpractice outside of liability insurance and a
separate malpractice action.
Subsection (1) is a superfluous and redundant provision which essentially states that each adoption entity shall
comply with the law. Such concept is inherent in the law. This subsection requires extensive and repetitive disclosures
and repetitive acknowledgement of receipt of disclosure. While written disclosure is important and customarily
provided, the provisions of this subsection are onerous and, when read in conjunction with the remaining subsections,
are apparently designed to encourage litigation and sanctions against attorneys.
Subsection (2) holds an attorney absolutely liable for any document error. The document provisions of
section (1) are so numerous, extensive and redundant that errors, which will not materially affect the child's placement,
are likely to occur. These provisions will result in an increase in malpractice insurance premiums, and many errors
may not be covered by current malpractice policies: Accordingly, many reputable attorneys may withdraw from
adoption practice. Additionally, the small family practitioner preparing a stepparent adoption is also exposed to these
extreme liability standards. No other Florida statute holds attorneys strictly liable.
Subsection (3) proposes to hold attorneys liable outside of any malpractice proceeding when a consent is set
aside for fraud or duress. Like subsection (2), this provision would render adoption attorneys uninsurable or insurable
at high rates. Such an award would most likely not be covered by current malpractice policies. In order to assert any
right to insurance coverage in the event of a negative ruling, the attorneys must place their malpractice insurer on notice
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of any adoption challenge and allow the insurer to participate in the defense of that challenge. Such an action would
violate the privacy and confidentiality provisions of an adoption proceeding.
Subsection (4) holds attorneys and adoptive parents absolutely liable for attorneys' fees and costs of a birth
parent who successfully challenges an adoption. No other family law statute holds litigants strictly liable regardless of
ability to pay fees and costs. No Florida statute holds attorneys strictly liable. The concerns regarding insurability and
integrity within the practice also apply to this subsection.
This section creates liability and malpractice actions within the adoption statute, eliminating privity of contract
requirements and the right to ajury trial.
4. Proposed Section 63.052(2) and (3): Foster Care Placements
This section mandates that a child be placed in licensed foster care when an adoptive home is not identified at
the time the child is discharged from a medical facility. This would prohibit adoption entities from taking a child into
private care, thereby substantially raising the initial costs of such adoptions to adoptive parents, and potentially to the
State of Florida, and causing unnecessary complications and delays. A child cannot be placed in State sponsored foster
care unless a Court finds that the child has been abandoned, abused or neglected, adjudicates the child dependent and
provides for a reunification case plan or adoption case plan. Privately licensed foster care is expensive. Moreover,
some birth parents were raised in foster care and specifically choose private adoption for their children to avoid the
foster care system. This provision would eliminate a choice for these birth parents.
Proposed Section 63.082 (4) also encourages parents to place their children in foster care. This is an
extremely expensive and detrimental provision. Foster care costs are already a large burden upon the State budget and
children's advocates are always seeking new funds to improve our currently overburdened foster care system where
children are frequently abused and neglected. Moreover, the parental rights of a child placed in foster care cannot be
terminated for twelve months. Thus, the location of a permanent home for a child is substantially delayed.
5. Proposed Section 63.062(1)(d)(3): Birth Father Consents
This section requires notice to any man who the birth mother has reason to believe may be the birth father,
regardless of whether the man provided financial or emotional support to the birth mother, or assisted her in obtaining
medical care. This requirement places an undue burden on birth mothers and adoptive parents and will substantially
increase the risk of frivolous, time consuming and expensive litigation, thus raising the costs of an adoption and
rendering some adoptions unstable (e.g, if a birth mother lists 12 potential fathers, the adoptive parents must pay
expensive investigative and legal costs to search, notify, and obtain consent from each possible father). Any man who
had relations with the birth mother around the time of conception could unnecessarily delay or block an adoption, thus
prohibiting the birth mother from making decisions in the best interest of her child. This provision could potentially
encourage a birth mother to lie about the identity of a potential father after her consent to an adoption is irrevocable,
thus providing her an additional avenue to challenge an adoption and disrupt the placement and stability of a child.
Unstable and lengthy adoptions do not serve the interests of a child. Currently, the law sets forth a clearly defined class
of fathers whose consent is required, i.e. a man married to the mother, a man who has filed with the office of vital
statistics and a man who has filed a paternity action. Under the current law, attorneys and adoptive parents may search
public records to determine whether a father's consent is necessary for an adoption. As proposed, this stability would
be removed from the statute.
6. Proposed Section 63.052(2): Non Paternity Affidavits
This provision allows adoption entities to obtain an affidavit of nonpaternity from any named father prior to
the birth of the child. The proposed modification reasonably fills a hole in the current statute and encourages stable and
safe adoptions by allowing the adoption entity to advise the adoptive parents, prior to taking the child into their home,
of the status and stability of their adoption.
However, proposed section 63.052(4)(a) directly conflicts with this provision as it states that an affidavit of
non-paternity may not be executed until after the birth of the child. Many potential birth fathers who deny paternity are
difficult to locate and frequently move. Thus, it may take many weeks or even after the placement of the child in the
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adoptive home to locate these men to obtain their non-patemity affidavits which may potentially cause uncertain and
unstable adoptions. Many of these men have not supported the birth mother and would otherwise have no legal right to
object to an adoption.
7. Proposed Section 63.082(3)(a): Social Worker Interviews of Birth Parents
This provision requiring a social worker interview with a birth parent prior to execution of a consent for
adoption conforms with current standards of practice and assures that all precautions are taken to obtain a valid consent
for adoption.
8. Proposed Section 63.082 (4): Language and Form of Consents
This subsection also requires that all adoption consents contain the following language:
You have the right to:
(A) Consult with and attorney;
(B) Hold, care for, and feed the child;
(C) Place the child in foster care or with any friend or family
member you choose who is willing to care for your child;
(D) Take the child home;
(E) Find out about the community resources that are available
to you if you do not go through with the abortion.
(THIS IS TYPED IN 16 POINT BOLD FACE).
(Additional language is omitted).
The above language incorporated into a consent would only insult and traumatize a birth parent signing a consent to
adoption. Birth parents who voluntarily sign a consent for adoption do so after much thought and contemplation. The
staff and social workers at the hospital and the social worker who interviews the birth parent discuss these rights in a
private, dignified and personal manner prior to the time that a consent for adoption is presented to the birth parent for
signature. Many hospitals require a similar form which is not in which assumes that a birth parent is not intelligent and
cannot read normal type.
9. Proposed Section 63.082(4) and (7): Three (3) Day Revocation Period
This subsection allows a three (3) day revocation period which would only serve to promote unstable
placements and exploit the emotions of the adoptive parents. The majority of birth mothers are offered or receive
counseling prior to executing a consent for adoption and all birth mothers speak with a social worker and other
professionals prior to executing a consent for adoption. A birth mother may take as much time as she needs after the
birth of her baby before she signs any consent for adoption
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The recision period would place an adoptive child's home placement at risk, causing the child to be removed
from the original home many days after placement. For example, a birth parent who signs a consent on a Friday may
withdraw their consent by mail the following Tuesday. Such notification may not be received by the adoption entity
some 2 to 5 days after mailing.
Furthermore, many birth parents favor laws which provide that consents are final upon signing as those laws
allow them to proceed forward without the emotional burden of having additional days to continuously rethink their
decision.
10. Proposed Section 63.082(6): Repetitive Disclosure of Documents
This section requires that the adoption entity provide a copy of each signed consent to each person whose
consent is required and the adoption entity must obtain written verification that said copies were received. This
provision violates the confidentiality provisions of the statute and would unnecessarily increase the costs incurredby
adoptive parents.
11. Proposed Section 63.085(1): Statute of Repose and Appellate Period
Subsection 63.085(IX8) correctly advises birth parents that any action or proceeding to vacate an adoption
must be filed within one year of the final judgment because section 63.182 contains a statute of repose which protects
adoption orders from any challenge one year after entry of the final judgment of adoption.
However, subsection 63.085(l)(9) advises the birth parents that they have one year after entry of a final
judgment of adoption to appeal any irregularities in the adoption proceeding. While the statute does not technically
extend the appellate period, this misleading disclosure read in conjunction with subsections 63.085(l)(10) and
63.089(6)(c) would effectively extend the appeal period from thirty (30) days to one year. Subsection 63.085(1X10)
allows a birth parent to set aside an order terminating rights when their failure to timely assert their rights was the result
of misrepresentation and subsection 63.089(6)(c) renders all orders terminating parental rights voidable when a birth
parents' failure to act is the result of false information. Subsection 63.085(IX9) provides this misrepresentation which
would allow extension of the appellate period. Currently, all court order are subject to a 30 day appeal period a one
year appeal period would only serve to create unstable adoptions.
Pursuant to proposed section 63.142(4) a court is not authorized to enter a judgement for adoption until the
applicable appellate period has expired. As the language of this statute may potentially extend the appellate period to
one year, this would potentially delay finalization of adoption until the child is approximately eighteen (18) months old.
The mandatory disclosure laws advises a birth parent that they have one year to appeal an order terminating parental
rights, thereby postponing a final judgment until more than one year post-birth. This is inconsistent with prior sections,
which allow finalization within approximately 90-120 days post-birth. This could potentially delay the stability of an
adoption by two years thus, placing a child at risk of removal from an adoptive home at the age of two. Such a scenario
is detrimental to a child.
12. Proposed Section 63.087(4): Venue
This section requires that all adoption proceedings be filed in the venue where the birth parents reside, thus
eliminating the privacy provision which allowed adoptive parents to file their adoption proceeding in the venue where
their chosen adoptive entity exists if such choice protected the privacy of the adoptive parents. The privacy provision
has served to protect one of the primary and essential elements of an adoption - the identity and location of the adoptive
parents. The large majority of adoptions are uncontested. Only an extremely small number are challenged each year.
This provision would require that adoptive parents incur the additional expenses of filing outside the venue in every
uncontested case. The current law protects birth parents as a common law challenge to venue would allow the birth
parents to keep venue in their place of residence.
13. Proposed Section 63.087(6): Termination of Parental Rights Separate from Adoption Proceeding
55
Eisen: Using a "Brief Case Plan" Method To Reconcile Kinship Rights and
Published by NSUWorks, 1998
394 Nova Law Review [Vol. 23:339
This procedure is contrary to current law that provides that the birth parent's rights are not terminated until the
rights of the adoptive parents are vested. This proceeding would effectively render a child without a legal parent for an
extensive period, thus raising concerns on the ability to authorize medical treatment, etc. Leaving a child without a
legal parent is contrary to the child's best interests. Thejuvenile court system is currently experiencing many problems
caused by children who do not have a legal parent for long periods of time while they await adoption.
Furthermore, as the petition requires no responsive pleading, the additional proceeding has no effect. The
proceeding only creates substantial delay, additional legal expenses which must be borne by the adoptive parents, and
increases use of valuable Court resources. Currently, birth parents who seek to challenge a petition for adoption may
do so by appearing in court or filing a motion. They gain no further rights under this proceeding.
The time delays caused by this proceeding are substantial. Currently, a petition for adoption may be filed
immediately after placement. Provided all consents or waivers are secured, an adoption may be finalized ninety (90)
days after placement. Proposed section 63.089 requires thirty (30) days notice after service of process before a hearing
on a Petition to Terminate Rights may be held. If the adoptive parents must publish to provide proper service to any
man who reasonably may be the father, they must wait sixty (60) days after diligent search and publication prior to
holding a hearing to terminate rights. After a delayed order terminating parental right is entered, the adoptive parents
must wait an additional thirty (30) days before filing a Petition for adoption. These delayed time periods are
unnecessary and potentially harm the best interest of a child. Currently, Chapter 39 provides that parents subject to
termination of parental rights petitions are entitled to a hearing as soon a reasonably possible, much earlier than 30
days. If a birth parent seeks to challenge an adoptive placement, the courts should proceed expeditiously, as delays
cause a child to further bond with adoptive parents who may lose custody of the child.
Subsection 63.089 requires a full evidentiary hearing in all adoption proceedings. Again, the large majority of
such proceedings are uncontested. This additional proceeding requires that the adoptive parents incur additional legal
expenses. Currently, the law protects birth parents by requiring a full evidentiary hearing upon challenge to a petition
for adoption. In the non-contesting case, the adoptive parents must also bear this additional unnecessary cost.
While these proceedings require the adoptive parent to incur many additional expenses and costs, no
requirements are placed upon the birth parents. Proposed section 63.089 does not even require that birth parents appear
in court to protect their rights. This section allows written denial of a petition to terminate rights. All other statutes
concerning termination of parental rights mandate the personal appearance of the parent. Without a personal
appearance, the Court would be unable to proceed in the case and conduct the mandatory inquiries. Moreover, any
parent truly serious about maintaining parental rights should personally appear before the Court. These provisions
would apply to any man who reasonably may be the father, regardless of his attempts to support the birth mother and
the child.
14. Proposed section 63.087(6)(b): Standing to File Petition to Terminate Rights
This subsection allows only a birth parent or legal guardian of a minor to file a petition for termination of
parental rights. The proposed law changes the custodial arrangements for a child after a birth parents signs a consent
for adoption. Under current law the adoptive parent becomes guardian of the child. As proposed, neither the adoption
entity nor the adoptive parents may become the legal guardian of the child. Thus, the birth mother must petition the
court to terminate her own legal rights to her child. This procedure makes an adoption extremely stressful and
potentially traumatic for the birth parent. Moreover, the birth mother is now a party to the proceeding and could
potentially request records which would provide confidential information regarding the adoptive parents.
15. Proposed section 63.088(4) & (5): Diligent Search and Inquiry & Publication
Subsection 63.088(4) mandates a diligent search and inquiry much greater than the burden currently placed
upon the Department of Children & Families in Chapter 39 Termination of Parental Rights proceedings. This
extensive diligent search requires that the adoptive parents search records to which they may not have standing to gain
access: re: pension records, utility company records, tax records. This would be an extensive and expensive search
which may be impossible to complete. Unlike the Department of Children & Families, adoption entities may not
access certain private records.
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Subsection 63.088(5) requires that the adoption entity publish their intent to terminate parental rights by
publishing information on the birth mother and the child. This is an affront to the privacy of the birth mother.
According to the provision, this must be done as to any man who reasonably may be the father of the child regardless
of any history of rape or abuse upon the birth mother, and could be emotionally devastating for the birth mother.
16. Proposed section 63.089(4): Abandonment and Affirmative Duty to Support Child and Birth
Mother
This subsection substantially changes affirmative duties which a birth father currently has to provide
emotional and financial support to the birth mother during her pregnancy. This provision effectively overturns and
ignores United States and Florida Supreme Court precedent on parental rights. Pursuant to this provision, a court may
not waive the birth father's consent for failing to provide emotional support to the birth mother, thus stripping the birth
mother of the ability to choose an adoption in the best interest of her child when she is emotionally abandoned and
abused by the birth father.
The proposed statute also places an additional burden upon the birth mother to prove abandonment by the
birth father. In order to make an adoption decision in the best interests of her child, she must affirmatively show that
the father or any man who may reasonably be the father.
1. has demonstrated a willful disregard for the safety of the child.
2. has not been prevented from making efforts towards the child by any person.
3. was provided with a request for financial support.
4. has refused to pay for medical treatment when insurance or other State funded resources would not pay for
such treatment
5. provided only nominal funds which were insufficient to provide for the child's needs given the relative
ability to pay of the parties.
6. knew her whereabouts and was advised of all medical appointments and tests relating to the child or
pregnancy.
The above burden is much greater than the burden placed upon the Department of Children and Families
when seeking termination for abandonment in a Chapter 39 proceeding. Most importantly, it is degrading and strips a
birth mother of her right to choose adoption as an option for her child, forcing her to parent a child that she cannot
afford and prepare for a life of fighting to receive child support from a father who did not support her during her
pregnancy. These burdens would require a woman who has been abused by the birth father to initiate constant contact
so that she can prove an abandonment claim. She also maintains this burden to contact him even after he moves with
no notice to her, causing her to search for him to give him proper notice. The proposed statute allows a father to sit
back and wait for the birth mother to come begging for money despite her obvious need. It also allows a birth father to
rely on State funds such as Medicaid to pay for his responsibilities, a burden this State cannot afford.
17. Proposed Section 63.089(4)(b): Abandonment by Habitual Criminals
This subsection authorizes a court to determine that a child is abandoned by the birth parent when the parent is
incarcerated for a sentence of eight (8) years or more and the parents criminal history meets specific delineated criteria.
This is a positive provision which will serve to provide a child permanency when a parent is not available to raise the
child. This provision is consistent with similar provisions in Chapter 39.
18. Proposed Section 63.089()and(6)(e) Authority to Order Paternity Testing
This subsection provides the Court with authority to order patemity testing. This is an important inclusion
into the statute allowing all potential issues to be resolved by the samejudge.
19. Proposed Section 63.097(4)(2): Prohibition Against Payment of Previously Incurred Expenses.
This subsection prohibits the payment of any expenses incurred by the birth mother prior to the time that the
adoptive parents contracted with the adoption entity. This provision would prohibit adoptive parents from receiving
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reimbursement when a birth mother backs out of a situation and is matched with other adoptive parents through another
adoption entity. This would necessarily increase the risk and expense to adoptive parents.
20. Proposed section 63.132(c): Confidential Record Publication by the Florida Department of Children
& Families
This subsection requires that the Department of Children & Families retain extensive records on each
adoption filed in the State of Florida and pay staff to redact confidential information. This would not only increase the
costs to Florida's taxpayers, but creates great risk of unintentional release of confidential information to the public.
Historically, the Department of Children & Families fails to comply with the duties imposed upon it under Florida
Law. This law would allow birth mothers to comparison shop for the adoption entity which pays the highest living
expenses.
21. Proposed Section 63.132(d)(5): Expenses
This section requires an affidavit seeking approval of expenses that could be covered by State sponsored
programs. Again, this provision mandates that birth parents access state funds at the expense of Florida's budget and
Florida taxpayers.
22. Proposed Section 63.207: Prohibition Against Out of State Placements
This section prohibits any adoption entity from placing a child with a family which resides outside of the State
of Florida unless the child is a member of a minority group or is otherwise special needs. This prohibition wrongly
treats children as a commodity of the State of Florida and discriminates against minority children by sending a message
that they are not a desirable commodity of the State. This provision would limit a birth parent's right to choose an
appropriate home for a child and violates the child's constitutional right to travel.
Only one state has a statute which contains similar prohibitions. The case law in that state (South Carolina)
creates exceptions to the law which have rendered the law powerless.
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APPENDIX F
RESULTS OF POLLING FLORIDA ADOPTION PROFESSIONALS
REGARDING PSYCHO/SOCIAL BACKGROUNDS
OF CHILDREN PLACED FOR ADOPTION
Twenty-three Florida adoption lawyers and social workers responding to a survey in
the summer of 1998 responded as shown to the following queries:
I. Please Indicate whether the following are typical of the psycho/social backgrounds
of children in whose adoptions you have been professionally Involved:
Typical Occasional Aypical No Response
23 0
0 0
1 0
2 0
10
15
10
7
8
0
0
0
5 0
14 7
0 0
2 0
(1) child newborn to age 5
(2) child suffering/likely to suffer
physical, developmental, learning
or mental disabilities
(3) parent lacking planning/follow-
through skills
(4) parent possessing decreased
emotional/mental stability and
control, including immaturity due
to young age
(5) parent engaging in or having
history of alcohoVsubstance
abuse/gambling
(6) parent having history of mental
ness and/or psychiatric admission
(7) parent having history of
incarceration
(8) parent having history of
perpetrating or being victim of
abuse/neglect
(9) parent having negative
history as to any other of his/her
children (estrangement,
nonsupport, abandonment,
removal)
(10) history of instability in parent's
family of origin
(11) parent lacing the extemal support
of family and friends
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Occasional Atypical No Response
9 0
2 0
(12) lack of community resources in
location where parent resides or
would reside with child
(13) parent being socially isolated
(14) parent in unstable marriage to party
other than child's other parent
(15) parent possessing low level of
primary education/skills training
(16) parent illiterate
(17) parent unemployed for more than
three months
(18) parent highly transient
(19) parent housed inadequately
il. Please list by number which of the above background characteristics, if any, you consider
as risk factors for child abuse or neglect based on your professional experience:
(#1) 2 (#2) 8 (#3) 8 (#4) 16 (#5) 18 (#6) 12 (#7) 11 (#8) 18 (#9) 12 (#10) 10 (#11) 13 (#12)
8 (#13) 8 (#14) 11 (#15) 9 (#16) 7 (#17) 10 (#18) 6 (#19) 7 (No Response) 3
Ill. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statement. A birth mother
who has voluntarily surrendered her child for adoption should not be able to reclaim the child herself
if the birth father subsequently objects to the adoption and the placement is disrupted.
0 Agree: The mother has made her decision about parenting the child and it should be
final; the father should get sole custody
8 Uncertain: The mother should not get automatic custody, but she should have a right to
request custody.
14 Disagree: Matters should go back to the way they stood before the mother surrendered; the
mother should have custody unless and until the father proves her to be unfit
No Opinion
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APPENDIX G
FORM FOR WORKSHEET FOR BIRTH MOTHER'S AFFIDAVIT
BIRTH MOTHER'S AFFIDAVIT WORKSHEET RE: BIRTH FATHER
DIRECTIONS: TO BE COMPLETED BY BIRTH MOTHER, WITH STAFF ASSISTANCE/REVIEW
I. Does the birth father know you are pregnant and that you believe he is the father of your
child? Yes No
II. If known, please provide the birth fathers:
A. Full legal name
B. Current address
C. Current telephone
D. Social security number
E. Date of birth
F. Current work telephone
Ill. If the birth father's current location is not known, please provide his:
A. Last known address
B. Last known telephone
C. Birth father's friends or relatives who may know how to reach him (with their addresses
and telephone numbers)
IV. Additional identifying/locating information you may know regarding the birth father.
V. Date you last saw the birth father
Date you last talked on the phone with the birth father
Date you last received any written communication from the birth father
Address at which birth father last knew you to be residing
VI. If more than one man may be the birth father, please provide information requested in II. and Ill.
for such other man or men on the back of this sheet
If none others, please write 'none' here:
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VII. Are you now married or were you married at any time during the past twelve (12) months?
Yes No
If yes, please provide:
A. Husband's name
B. Husband's address
C. Husband's telephone
D. Husband's date of birth
E. Husband's social security no.
F. Date of marriage
G. Date of divorce (if applicable)
H. Date of death (if applicable)
VIII. Were you living with any man other than those named In I., VI., and VII., above, within the past
twelve (12) months? Yes No
If yes, please provide the information requested in I1. through V., above, on the back of this page.
IX. Has any man, other than those you have listed in I1., VI., VII., and VIII., above, claimed to be the
father, given you support, promised you support, or been named as the father of your child in
connection with receiving welfare payments? Yes No
If yes, please provide the information requested in I1. through V., above, on the back of this page.
X. Do you have other children? Yes No
If yes, please provide:
Child's Name Date of Birth
Father's Name
Child's Name Date of Birth
Father's Name
Xl. Please provide the following information:
A. City, county, state-where child was conceived
B. Cities, counties, states in which you resided/have been residing while pregnant
C. Your permanent address
D. Your next of kin/emergency contact
KNOWING THE IMPORTANCE of providing as much accurate and complete information as I have
regarding the identity and location of the birth father of my child, I hereby certify that I have completed the
foregoing form to the best of my knowledge.
x x
Birth Mother Agency Representative
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APPENDIX H
FORM FOR NOTICE OF ACTION AND HEARING
FOR PROPOSED TPRPA PROCEEDING
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR COUNTY, FLORIDA
In the Interest of: JUVENILE DIVISION
,_ _ CASE NO.:
a Child.
NOTICE OF ACTION AND HEARING
TO: [names and addresses of all putative fathers and/or unknown claimants, as well as any
any other persons as set forth in Florida Statutes section 39. 462(1) (Supm. 1998)1.
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that a hearing on a Petition for Termination of Parental
Rights Pending Adoption as to the Child herein, born ,to , will be
held before this Court
AT COUNTY COURTHOUSE, ROOM
faddressl
THE HONORABLE , PRESIDING, TELEPHONE ( )__
ON AT__O'CLOCK._m.
YOU MUST EITHER APPEAR on the date and at the time specified or send a written response
to the Court before that time, with a copy to attorney for Petitioner, [name and address]. FAILURE TO
PERSONALLY RESPOND TO THIS NOTICE OR TO APPEAR AT THIS HEARING
CONSTITUTES CONSENT TO TERMINATION OR PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO THIS
CHILD (OR THESE CHILDREN).
YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE REPRESENTED BY AN ATTORNEY. IF YOU WANT
AN ATTORNEY AND CANNNOT AFFORD ONE, THE COURT WILL APPOINT ONE AT NO
CHARGE TO YOU IF YOU SO REQUEST.
YOU HAVE THE DUTY TO INFORM THE COURT AND ATTORNEY FOR
PETITIONER, BY CERTIFIED MAIL AT THE ADDRESSES SHOWN ABOVE, OF ANY
CHANGE IN YOUR ADDRESS.
WITNESS MY HAND AND THE SEAL OF THIS COURT -day of _ 19
CLERK
COURT SEAL
By: X
Deputy Clerk
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APPENDIX I
CLERK'S AFFIDAVIT OF COMPLIANCE WITH MAILING REOUIREMENTS
FOR CONSTRUCTIVE SERVICE OF PROCESS
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR __ COUNTY, FLORIDA
In the Interest of: JUVENILE DIVISION
_CASE NO.:
a Child.
CLERKS AFFIDAVIT OF MAIUNG NOTICE OF ACTION
TO
STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF
BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, appeared , personally known to me or
who produced as identification , and being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1. that s/he is a Deputy Clerk of the Office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court in and for
_ County, Florida, Juvenile Division, as such makes this Affidavit from her/his
own personal knowledge, and is over the age of eighteen.
2. that s/he did execute a Notice of Action and Hearing (=the Notice') to one
on _, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A".
3. that s/he did mail a copy of the Notice by United States mail, with postage prepaid, to said
.at ,within 10 days after making the Notice, to wit, on
together with a copy of the Petition for Termination of Parental Rights Pending Adoption
herein, and noted upon the docket the date of mailing.
4. that, as of the date of this Affidavit, the Notice so mailed to has not been
returned by the United States Postal Service as undeliverable.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
AFFIANT'S SIGNATURE: X
PRINT NAME: , Deputy Clerk
DATE:
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this _ day of , 19
NOTARIAL SEAL
Notary Public
[Vol. 23:339
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APPENDIX J
BIRTH PARENTS READINESS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR COUNTY, FLORIDA
In the Interest of
JUVENILE DIVISION
CASE NO.:
a Child.
BIRTH PARENT'S READINESS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Please read and, If you agree, Initial each of the following statements before signing the papers
(called "Surrender and Consent for Adoption with Waiver of Notice, Service of Process, and Right
to Counsel') allowing your child to be adopted.
1. You have read and understand what you are about to sign and have no questions about the
papers or procedures Involved.
2. You are aware that you have the right to have your own Independent lawyer explain these papers
to you at no charge to you.
3. You understand that when you sign these papers you are permanently ending all your rights as
birth parent of this child, and you will not be given notice of any of the court proceedings for
the adoption of your child.
4. You understand that unless he or she chooses to locate you after age 18, you may never see
your child again.
5. You are aware that there are choices other than adoption for you and your child, Including
putting the child into foster care for a while or keeping the child yourself.
6. You are aware that you could choose to take more time to decide what to do.
7. You are signing these papers of your own free will.
8. You feel well enough emotionally and physically to sign these papers.
9. You are not under the Influence of any prescribed medication or other drugs that would affect
your ability to understand what you are doing.
10. You are not under the Influence of alcohol.
Initials __Page 1 of 2
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BIRTH PARENT'S READINESS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Please read and, If you agree, Initial each of the following statements before signing the papers
(called "Surrender and Consent for Adoption with Waiver of Notice, Service of Process, and Right
to Counsel") allowing your child to be adopted.
11. You acknowledge receiving copies of all the papers you are signing.
I HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND THE PREVIOUS 11 STATEMENTS.
BIRTH PARENT'S SIGNATURE:
PRINT NAME:
DATE:
STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF
BEFORE ME, an officer authorized to take acknowledgments, appeared _, personally
known to me or who produced as identification , and acknowledged that s/he did execute
the foregoing Birth Parent's Readiness Acknowledgement freely, voluntarily and for the purposes stated
therein.
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL in the state and county last aforesaid this
,19 - .
NOTARIAL SEAL
_ day of
Notary Public
Page 2 of 2 Initials
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